Am. Jur. 2d

Automobile Issues

While there are many definitions of the term "automobile," 1  the courts have taken the commonly understood meaning of the term. 2  Basically, an automobile is a self-propelled vehicle which does not run upon fixed rails or tracks. 3   Some definitions add the further requirement that the vehicle be designed for carrying persons or property on a highway. 4   A further defining feature has been the number of wheels, it being said that to the average person and to the public mind it is common knowledge that the word "automobile" indicates a motor-driven vehicle mounted on four wheels, 5    as distinguished from one mounted on two or three wheels, such as a motorcycle or a bicycle. 6   

Footnote 1. For the purposes of federal statutory provisions concerning the disclosure of automobile information, the term "automobile" is defined to include any passenger car or station wagon.  15 USCA §  1231(c).

For purposes of federal statutory provisions dealing with automobile fuel economy, an automobile is defined as a four wheeled vehicle that is propelled by fuel or by alternative fuel, manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads and highways, except a vehicle operated only on a rail line, within certain weight limits.  49 USCA §  32901(a)(3).

As to the meaning of "automobile" or "motor vehicle" for automobile or accident insurance purposes, see 7 Am Jur 2d,  Automobile Insurance §§ 197-204,  338; 44 Am Jur 2d,  Insurance § 634.

As to the meaning of "automobile" for no-fault insurance purposes, see 7 Am Jur 2d,  Automobile Insurance § 353.

Footnote 2. Jernigan v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y., 235 N.C. 334, 69 S.E.2d 847 (1952) (holding that a farm tractor, although a motor vehicle, is not an automobile); Mittelsteadt v. Bovee,  9 Wis. 2d 44, 100 N.W.2d 376,  74 A.L.R.2d 1259 (1960).

Footnote 3. In re Fall, 192 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995); National Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 39 Ala. App. 199, 96 So. 2d 708 (1957); Merrill v. Packard, 395 So. 2d 285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1981), review denied, 402 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1981).

Footnote 4. In re Fall, 192 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995); Merrill v. Packard, 395 So. 2d 285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1981), review denied, 402 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1981); Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, 74 N.E. 1035 (1905); Hoover v. National Cas. Co., 236 Mo. App. 1093, 162 S.W.2d 363 (1942); Jernigan v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y., 235 N.C. 334, 69 S.E.2d 847 (1952).

Footnote 5. Mittelsteadt v. Bovee,  9 Wis. 2d 44, 100 N.W.2d 376,  74 A.L.R.2d 1259 (1960).

Footnote 6.  §§ 5,  7.

"Motor vehicle" is a broad term that has no universally accepted meaning. 7   It has been considered to be much broader than the word "automobile," and to include various vehicles which cannot be classified as automobiles. 8              

Generally, a motor vehicle must be self-propelled 9      and must not operate on tracks or rails. 10     Some jurisdictions exclude vehicles powered by human or animal power. 11  

The term motor vehicle necessarily excludes trains 12  or subways, 13   but may either include 14   or exclude trackless trolleys. 15   And most jurisdictions limit the meaning of the phrase "motor vehicles" to transportation on land, not water 16  or air, 17  although it has been held that a motorboat is a motor vehicle within the meaning of federal bankruptcy law. 18

Some jurisdictions have a requirement that a vehicle, in order to be deemed a "motor vehicle," must have been designed for use upon a highway, 19  or be commonly or generally used to transport persons and property over the public highways. 20

The term motor vehicle has been held to include a bus, 21   a utility van, 22  a go-cart constructed of metal tubing, powered by a lawnmower-type engine, 23   and a motor-driven sprinkler truck. 24

A golf cart may be considered a motor vehicle if it is operated on the highways, 25  but not when it is driven on a golf course. 26

Footnote 7. Williams v. Radivoj, 111 B.R. 361 (S.D. Fla. 1989).

Footnote 8. State v. Carpenter, 113 Idaho 882, 749 P.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Ridinger, 364 Mo. 684, 266 S.W.2d 626,  42 A.L.R.2d 617 (1954); Jernigan v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y., 235 N.C. 334, 69 S.E.2d 847 (1952); State v. Sohn,  193 Wis. 2d 346, 535 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 537 N.W.2d 572 (Wis. 1995).

All automobiles are motor vehicles.  State v. Sohn,  193 Wis. 2d 346, 535 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 537 N.W.2d 572 (Wis. 1995); People v. Lopez,  144 Misc. 2d 325, 544 N.Y.S.2d 410 (Sup. Ct. 1989); Jernigan v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y., 235 N.C. 334, 69 S.E.2d 847 (1952).

As to what constitutes a "motor vehicle" within statutes making it an offense to drive while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol, see  § 359.

As to the definition of the term "motor vehicle" as used in various federal statutes, see 18 USCA §§  31,  47(c)(2),  2311; 40 USCA §  472(l); 49 USCA §  30102(a)(6).

As to the meaning of "motor vehicle" for no-fault insurance purposes, see 7 Am Jur 2d,  Automobile Insurance § 353.

Annotation: What is "motor vehicle" within automobile guest statute,  98 A.L.R.2d 543.

Footnote 9. U.S. v. A Single Story Double Wide Trailer, 727 F. Supp. 149 (D. Del. 1989); In re Race, 159 B.R. 857, 1994 A.M.C. 1214 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993), decision rev'd on other grounds, 192 B.R. 949 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Willson v. Cagle, 694 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Cal. 1988), related reference, 711 F. Supp. 1521 (N.D. Cal. 1988), related reference, 894 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1990) and order aff'd, 900 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1990); Williams v. State, 884 P.2d 167 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Worthey, 314 Ark. 185, 861 S.W.2d 307 (1993); Bertrand v. Board of County Com'rs of Park County, 872 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994); Mike Eskew Motor Co., Inc. v. Kelley, 583 So. 2d 95 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1991); State v. Senko, 457 A.2d 824 (Me. 1983); Foster v. Curtis, 213 Mass. 79, 99 N.E. 961 (1912); Mull v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 444 Mich. 508, 510 N.W.2d 184 (1994) (called into doubt on other grounds by, Ransomes America Corp. v. Spartan Distributors, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Mich. 1996)); Great American Ins. Co. v. Golla, 493 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); St. Louis Flying Club v. St. Louis County, 866 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1993); State v. Delap, 237 Mont. 346, 772 P.2d 1268 (1989); State v. Dunklee, 76 N.H. 439, 84 A. 40 (1912); State v. Richardson, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 690, 831 P.2d 989 (1992); Newman v. Basin Motor Co., 98 N.M. 39, 644 P.2d 553, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 354 (Ct. App. 1982); People v. Lopez,  144 Misc. 2d 325, 544 N.Y.S.2d 410 (Sup. Ct. 1989); People v. Cephas,  110 Misc. 2d 1075, 443 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Jernigan v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y., 235 N.C. 334, 69 S.E.2d 847 (1952); State v. Heins, 72 Ohio St. 3d 504, 651 N.E.2d 933 (1995); Gallo v. J.C. PenneyCas. Ins. Co., 328 Pa. Super. 267, 476 A.2d 1322 (1984), related reference, 335 Pa. Super. 311, 484 A.2d 148 (1984), related reference, 363 Pa. Super. 308, 526 A.2d 359 (1987), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 623, 538 A.2d 876 (1988); State v. Vasser, 870 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988); State v. McGary, 37 Wash. App. 856, 683 P.2d 1125 (1984), review denied, (Nov. 2, 1984); Lemon v. Federal Ins. Co.,  111 Wis. 2d 563, 331 N.W.2d 379 (1983); State v. Sohn,  193 Wis. 2d 346, 535 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 537 N.W.2d 572 (Wis. 1995).

Footnote 10. Willson v. Cagle, 694 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Cal. 1988), related reference, 711 F. Supp. 1521 (N.D. Cal. 1988), related reference, 894 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1990) and order aff'd, 900 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1990); Bertrand v. Board of County Com'rs of Park County, 872 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994); State v. Senko, 457 A.2d 824 (Me. 1983); State v. Delap, 237 Mont. 346, 772 P.2d 1268 (1989); People v. Lopez,  144 Misc. 2d 325, 544 N.Y.S.2d 410 (Sup. Ct. 1989); Jernigan v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y., 235 N.C. 334, 69 S.E.2d 847 (1952); State v. Sohn,  193 Wis. 2d 346, 535 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 537 N.W.2d 572 (Wis. 1995).
Footnote 11. Williams v. State, 884 P.2d 167 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994); State v. Delap, 237 Mont. 346, 772 P.2d 1268 (1989); County of Westchester v. Winstead,  231 A.D.2d 630, 647 N.Y.S.2d 536 (2d Dep't 1996); Putka v. Parma, 90 Ohio App. 3d 647, 630 N.E.2d 380 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1993), stay granted, 67 Ohio St. 3d 1448, 619 N.E.2d 1 (1993) and dismissed, jurisdictional motion overruled, 67 Ohio St. 3d 1450, 619 N.E.2d 419 (1993); State v. McGary, 37 Wash. App. 856, 683 P.2d 1125 (1984), review denied, (Nov. 2, 1984).

Footnote 12. Willson v. Cagle, 694 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Cal. 1988), related reference, 711 F. Supp. 1521 (N.D. Cal. 1988), related reference, 894 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1990) and order aff'd, 900 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1990).

Footnote 13. People v. Cephas,  110 Misc. 2d 1075, 443 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1981).

Footnote 14. In re Race, 159 B.R. 857, 1994 A.M.C. 1214 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993), decision rev'd on other grounds, 192 B.R. 949 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Worthey, 314 Ark. 185, 861 S.W.2d 307 (1993); Mull v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 444 Mich. 508, 510 N.W.2d 184 (1994) (called into doubt on other grounds by, Ransomes America Corp. v. Spartan Distributors, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Mich. 1996)); State v. Richardson, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 690, 831 P.2d 989 (1992); Lemon v. Federal Ins. Co.,  111 Wis. 2d 563, 331 N.W.2d 379 (1983).

Footnote 15. State v. Heins, 72 Ohio St. 3d 504, 651 N.E.2d 933 (1995); Gallo v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 328 Pa. Super. 267, 476 A.2d 1322 (1984), related reference, 335 Pa. Super. 311, 484 A.2d 148 (1984), related reference, 363 Pa. Super. 308, 526 A.2d 359 (1987), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 623, 538 A.2d 876 (1988); State v. Vasser, 870 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Footnote 16. In re Fall, 192 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Berra, 891 S.W.2d 150 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1995); Ozolins v. North Lake Community College, a Div. of Dallas County Community College Dist., 805 S.W.2d 614, 66 Ed. Law Rep. 852 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1991); State v. Martin, 55 Wash. App. 275, 776 P.2d 1383 (1989), review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1033, 784 P.2d 532 (1989).

Footnote 17. General Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 915 F.2d 1038, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 73 (6th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, (Nov. 15, 1990); State v. Heins, 72 Ohio St. 3d 504, 651 N.E.2d 933 (1995).

Footnote 18. In re Race, 192 B.R. 949 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Williams v. Radivoj, 111 B.R. 361 (S.D. Fla. 1989).

Footnote 19. Bertrand v. Board of County Com'rs of Park County, 872 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994); Mike Eskew Motor Co., Inc. v. Kelley, 583 So. 2d 95 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1991); Great American Ins. Co. v. Golla, 493 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); St. Louis Flying Club v. St. Louis County, 866 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1993); State v. Delap, 237 Mont. 346, 772 P.2d 1268 (1989); State v. Richardson, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 690, 831 P.2d 989 (1992); Gallo v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 328 Pa. Super. 267, 476 A.2d 1322 (1984), related reference, 335 Pa. Super. 311, 484 A.2d 148 (1984), related reference, 363 Pa. Super. 308, 526 A.2d 359 (1987), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 623, 538 A.2d 876 (1988); Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988).

Footnote 20. Bertrand v. Board of County Com'rs of Park County, 872 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994); Mike Eskew Motor Co., Inc. v. Kelley, 583 So. 2d 95 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1991); Great American Ins. Co. v. Golla, 493 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); St. Louis Flying Club v. St. Louis County, 866 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1993); State v. Delap, 237 Mont. 346, 772 P.2d 1268 (1989); State v. Richardson, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 690, 831 P.2d 989 (1992); Gallo v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 328 Pa. Super. 267, 476 A.2d 1322 (1984), related reference, 335 Pa. Super. 311, 484 A.2d 148 (1984), related reference, 363 Pa. Super. 308, 526 A.2d 359 (1987), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 623, 538 A.2d 876 (1988).

Footnote 21. State v. Ridinger, 364 Mo. 684, 266 S.W.2d 626,  42 A.L.R.2d 617 (1954).

Footnote 22. State v. Vasser, 870 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Footnote 23. Coffey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 183 Mich. App. 723, 455 N.W.2d 740 (1990), appeal denied, 437 Mich. 1053, 472 N.W.2d 287 (1991) (when operated on public highways); Zapp v. Ross Pontiac, Inc.,  39 A.D.2d 739, 332 N.Y.S.2d 121 (2d Dep't 1972).

Footnote 24. Healy v. City of Philadelphia, 321 Pa. 488, 184 A. 124 (1936).

Footnote 25. State v. Russell, 508 N.W.2d 697 (Iowa 1993).

Footnote 26. Kenton County Public Parks Corp. v. Modlin, 901 S.W.2d 876 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

Ordinarily, every traveler has an equal right in the highway, and every part thereof, with every other traveler. 65   The public is entitled to the full and free use of all the territory embraced within a public roadway. 66   Hence, a traveler, as such, may occupy and use any part of the public highway he or she desires, when not needed by another whose rights thereto are superior to his or her own. 67      

Footnote 65. Carson v. Turrish, 140 Minn. 445, 168 N.W. 349 (1918); Grommet v. St. Louis County, 680 S.W.2d 246, 22 Ed. Law Rep. 578 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1984); Work v. Philadelphia Supply Co., 95 N.J.L. 193, 112 A. 185 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1920); Nordby v. Sorlie, 35 N.D. 395, 160 N.W. 70 (1916), reh'g denied, 37 N.D. 288, 163 N.W. 833 (1917).

Footnote 66. Grommet v. St. Louis County, 680 S.W.2d 246, 22 Ed. Law Rep. 578 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1984).

Footnote 67. Hatzakorzian v. Rucker-Fuller Desk Co., 197 Cal. 82, 239 P. 709,  41 A.L.R. 1027 (1925); Cupples Mercantile Co. v. Bow, 32 Idaho 774, 189 P. 48,  24 A.L.R. 1296 (1920); Hubbard v. Bartholomew, 163 Iowa 58, 144 N.W. 13 (1913); Black v. City of Berea, 137 Ohio St. 611, 19 Ohio Op. 427, 32 N.E.2d 1,  132 A.L.R. 1391 (1941); Jeffords v. Florence County, 165 S.C. 15, 162 S.E. 574,  81 A.L.R. 313 (1932).

For a discussion of what use of the highway includes, see 39 Am Jur 2d,  Highways, Streets and Bridges §§ 191-272.

The operation of a motor vehicle upon the public highways is not a fundamental right, but only a privilege 68   which the state may grant or withhold at pleasure in the course of its regulation and control of public ways. 69  

̈ Observation: Because the right to operate a motor vehicle is not a fundamental one, the state must show only a legitimate interest, rather than a compelling interest, to restrict or regulate the right. 70

Owners and operators of motor vehicles have the right to use the public highways on an equal footing with the owners and operators of other vehicles, 71    except as legislative restrictions have been imposed in reference to the size or other features of such vehicles. 72  

Footnote 68. Satterlee v. State, 289 Ark. 450, 711 S.W.2d 827 (1986); People v. Peterson, 734 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1987); State v. Smolen, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 385, 232 A.2d 339 (App. Div. 1967), certification denied, 155 Conn. 720, 231 A.2d 283 (1967), cert. denied,  389 U.S. 1044,  88 S. Ct. 787,  19 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1968); State v. Von Schmidt, 109 Idaho 736, 710 P.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1985); People v. Sass, 144 Ill. App. 3d 163, 98 Ill. Dec. 623, 494 N.E.2d 745 (4th Dist. 1986); Standish v. Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 235 Kan. 900, 683 P.2d 1276 (1984) (disagreement on other grounds recognized by, State Dept. of Licensing v. Lax, 74 Wash. App. 7, 871 P.2d 1098 (Div. 2 1994)) and (disagreed with on other grounds by, Department of Licensing v. Lax, 125 Wash. 2d 818, 888 P.2d 1190 (1995)); Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542, 85 N.E. 848 (1908); State v. Folda, 267 Mont. 523, 885 P.2d 426 (1994); State v. Skurdal, 235 Mont. 291, 767 P.2d 304 (1988); State v. Green, 229 Neb. 493, 427 N.W.2d 304 (1988); State v. Zoppi, 196 N.J. Super. 596, 483 A.2d 844 (Law Div. 1984); State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St. 3d 1, 15, 472 N.E.2d 689,  54 A.L.R.4th 139 (1984); Redden v. State, 739 P.2d 536 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); Com., Dept. of Transp. v. Wysocki, 517 Pa. 175, 535 A.2d 77 (1987) (declined to follow on other grounds by, People v. Krueger, 208 Ill. App. 3d 897, 153 Ill. Dec. 759, 567 N.E.2d 717 (2d Dist. 1991)); Goats v. State, 211 Tenn. 249, 364 S.W.2d 889 (1963); City of Spokane v. Port, 43 Wash. App. 273, 716 P.2d 945 (1986), review denied, (July 8, 1986); Brandmiller v. Arreola,  189 Wis. 2d 215, 525 N.W.2d 353 (Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 531 N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 1995) and decision aff'd,  199 Wis. 2d 528, 544 N.W.2d 894 (1996).

Footnote 69.  § 18.

Footnote 70. People v. Peterson, 734 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1987); Heying v. State, 515 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1987), reh'g denied, (Jan. 11, 1988) and transfer denied, (June 1, 1988).

Footnote 71. Slusher v. Safety Coach Transit Co., 229 Ky. 731, 17 S.W.2d 1012,  66 A.L.R. 1378 (1929); Commonwealth v. Nolan, 189 Ky. 34, 224 S.W. 506,  11 A.L.R. 202 (1920); City of St. Paul v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 187 Minn. 212, 245 N.W. 33 (1932); Nordby v. Sorlie, 35 N.D. 395, 160 N.W. 70 (1916), reh'g denied, 37 N.D. 288, 163 N.W. 833 (1917); Borough of Applewold v. Dosch, 239 Pa. 479, 86 A. 1070 (1913).

Footnote 72.  §§ 232 et seq.

Motorcycles are lawful vehicles, and their rights on the highway are the same as those of automobiles. 73   So too, in the absence of any specific regulation to the contrary, a bicycle is a vehicle of such a nature that it may be properly used upon the highways and streets. 74

Footnote 73. Van Cise v. Lencioni, 106 Cal. App. 2d 341, 235 P.2d 236 (1st Dist. 1951); Curtis v. Perry, 171 Wash. 542, 18 P.2d 840 (1933).

Footnote 74. Holland v. Bartch, 120 Ind. 46, 22 N.E. 83 (1889); Lee v. City of Port Huron, 128 Mich. 533, 87 N.W. 637 (1901); Taylor v. Union Traction Co., 184 Pa. 465, 40 A. 159 (1898); State v. Collins, 16 R.I. 371, 17 A. 131 (1888).

The use of highways for the purpose of transporting persons or property for hire, by the ordinary means, is incidental to and consistent with the primary purpose of their establishment, and is therefore a proper use, in the absence of any restrictive regulation. 75   Such use is not, however, one which may be exercised as of right, but is a special or permissive use, 76  which may be prohibited, restricted, or conditioned by the controlling public authority. 77  

Footnote 75. Ex parte Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781 (1915); Park Hotel Co. v. Ketchum,  184 Wis. 182, 199 N.W. 219,  33 A.L.R. 351 (1924) (taxicab).

Footnote 76. Stephenson v. Binford,  287 U.S. 251,  53 S. Ct. 181,  77 L. Ed. 288, Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1933A-440,  87 A.L.R. 721 (1932); City of Memphis v. State, 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S.W. 631 (1915); Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, 168 P. 516 (1917); Ex parte Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781 (1915).

Footnote 77.  § 26.

In the absence of a statute or ordinance to the contrary, a pedestrian has the right to use and travel upon any portion of a public highway or street at any time of the day or night, 78  and his or her rights and the rights of one operating a vehicle thereon are mutual, reciprocal, and equal. 79   Neither may use the public way in disregard of the right of the other to use it, and each must accommodate his or her movements to the other's lawful use of it; each must anticipate the other's possible presence, and each must recognize the dangers inherent in the manner in which it may lawfully be used by the other. 80   However, in many jurisdictions statutes or ordinances have been enacted which somewhat restrict the use of highways and streets by pedestrians, 81   and which govern the right of way as between pedestrians and motor vehicles. 82  

Footnote 78. Burk v. Extrafine Bread Bakery, 208 Cal. 105, 280 P. 522 (1929); Stringer v. Frost, 116 Ind. 477, 19 N.E. 331 (1889); Igo v. Smith, 282 Ky. 336, 138 S.W.2d 497 (1940) (disapproved of on other grounds by, Bettis v. Rickett, 310 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1958)); Foster v. Curtis, 213 Mass. 79, 99 N.E. 961 (1912); Cotten v. Stolley, 124 Neb. 855, 248 N.W. 384 (1933); Moebus v. Hermann, 108 N.Y. 349, 15 N.E. 415 (1888); Lowie v. Dixie Stores, 172 S.C. 468, 174 S.E. 394 (1934).

Footnote 79. Williamson v. Garrigus, 228 Ark. 705, 310 S.W.2d 8 (1958); Gregory v. Slaughter, 124 Ky. 345, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 500, 99 S.W. 247 (1907); Mahan v. State, to Use of Carr, 172 Md. 373, 191 A. 575 (1937); Hennessey v. Taylor, 189 Mass. 583, 76 N.E. 224 (1905); Walker v. McGraw, 279 Mich. 97, 271 N.W. 570 (1937); Layton v. Cook, 248 Miss. 690, 160 So. 2d 685 (1964); Deputy v. Kimmell, 73 W. Va. 595, 80 S.E. 919 (1914).

Footnote 80. Mahan v. State, to Use of Carr, 172 Md. 373, 191 A. 575 (1937).

Footnote 81.  §§ 344-348.

Footnote 82.  §§ 318 et seq.

C.  Regulation, In General [14-27]

1.  In General [14, 15]

It is well settled that the use of highways and streets by vehicular or pedestrian traffic may be limited, controlled, and regulated by the responsible public authority in the exercise of the police power whenever, and to the extent, necessary to provide for and promote the safety, peace, health, morals, and general welfare of the people. 83  Use of public highways and streets is subject to such reasonable and impartial regulations adopted pursuant to the police power as are calculated to secure to the general public the largest practical benefit from the enjoyment of the right of use, 84     and to provide for their safety while they are upon such public ways in the enjoyment of such right. 85   

The use of the highways and streets by vehicular or pedestrian traffic is subject to reasonable regulation by the state under the police power with which it is vested, 86   and by municipalities 87   and by administrative bodies or officials 88   acting under a delegation of such power to them by the state.  Moreover, such use of highways and streets is subject to regulation by the federal government within the limits of the power granted to it by the Constitution of the United States. 89    However, the power to regulate vehicles and their use of the public ways may not be used indirectly to control and regulate the business of the user. 90    Nor will the regulation and control of the use of highways and streets by vehicular or pedestrian traffic be assumed by the courts, since such matters involve the exercise of legislative and administrative functions. 91  

Subsequent subdivisions of this article contain a discussion of particular subjects of automotive regulation, including the licensing of vehicles and drivers, 92   equipment, weight, and size regulations, 93   and traffic regulations. 94  

Footnote 83. Clark v. Poor,  274 U.S. 554,  47 S. Ct. 702,  71 L. Ed. 1199, Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1927D-346 (1927) (called into doubt on other grounds by, American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner,  483 U.S. 266,  107 S. Ct. 2829,  97 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987)); Morris v. Duby,  274 U.S. 135,  47 S. Ct. 548,  71 L. Ed. 966 (1927); Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co.,  199 U.S. 279,  26 S. Ct. 91,  50 L. Ed. 192 (1905); Milnor v. New Jersey R. Co.,  70 U.S. 782, 17 F. Cas. 412, No. 9620,  16 L. Ed. 799 (C.C.D.N.J. 1857), aff'd by S.Ct. (See  70 U.S. 782); Tanner v. Heise, 672 F. Supp. 1356 (D. Idaho 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 879 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1989); Santa Barbara County v. More, 175 Cal. 6, 164 P. 895 (1917); City and County of Denver v. Thrailkill, 125 Colo. 488, 244 P.2d 1074 (1952); State v. Sturch, 82 Haw. 269, 921 P.2d 1170 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996), as amended, (June 27, 1996) and cert. denied, 82 Haw. 360, 922 P.2d 973 (Haw. 1996); People v. Blackorby, 146 Ill. 2d 307, 166 Ill. Dec. 902, 586 N.E.2d 1231 (1992); McCarthy v Leeds, 115 Me 134, 98 A 72; Rutledge Co-op. Ass'n v. Baughman, 153 Md. 297, 138 A. 29,  56 A.L.R. 1042 (1927); State v. Lawrence, 108 Miss. 291, 66 So. 745 (1914); Kunz v. City of St. Louis, 602 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1980); State v. Folda, 267 Mont. 523, 885 P.2d 426 (1994); State v. Luttrell, 159 Neb. 641, 68 N.W.2d 332 (1955); State v. Gallagher, 102 N.H. 335, 156 A.2d 765,  77 A.L.R.2d 1167 (1959); Haselton v. Interstate Stage Lines, 82 N.H. 327, 133 A. 451,  47 A.L.R. 218 (1926); Cedar Grove Tp. v. Sheridan, 209 N.J. Super. 267, 507 A.2d 304 (App. Div. 1986), certification denied, 104 N.J. 464, 517 A.2d 448 (1986);Smith v. Wilkins, 75 N.C. App. 483, 331 S.E.2d 159 (1985); Collins-Dietz-Morris Co. v. State Corp. Com'n, 154 Okla. 121, 7 P.2d 123,  80 A.L.R. 561 (1931); Barbour v. Walker, 126 Okla. 227, 259 P. 552,  56 A.L.R. 1049 (1927); State v. Justesen, 63 Or. App. 544, 665 P.2d 380 (1983), review denied, 295 Or. 840, 671 P.2d 1176 (1983); Robbins v. Limestone County, 114 Tex. 345, 268 S.W. 915 (1925), answer to certified question conformed to, 272 S.W. 526 (Tex. Civ. App. Waco 1925); State v. Stevens, 718 P.2d 398 (Utah 1986).

The state has a legitimate interest in the regulation of vehicular traffic on public highways.  State v. Reynolds, 117 N.M. 23, 868 P.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. granted, 117 N.M. 328, 871 P.2d 984 (1994) and rev'd on other grounds, 119 N.M. 383, 890 P.2d 1315 (1995); Pringle v. Wolfe,  88 N.Y.2d 426, 646 N.Y.S.2d 82, 668 N.E.2d 1376 (1996), cert. denied,  117 S. Ct. 513,  136 L. Ed. 2d 402 (U.S. 1996).

The right to travel is not a right to travel in any manner one wants, free of state regulation.  U.S. ex rel. Verdone v. Circuit Court for Taylor County, 851 F. Supp. 345, R.I.C.O. Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) ¶ 8547 (W.D. Wis. 1993), related reference, 61 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 1995), for text, see, 61 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 1995), published in full at, 73 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 1995).

Footnote 84. People v. Linde, 341 Ill. 269, 173 N.E. 361,  72 A.L.R. 997 (1930); City of Des Moines v. Keller, 116 Iowa 648, 88 N.W. 827 (1902); People v. Eaton, 100 Mich. 208, 59 N.W. 145 (1894); State v. Aldrich, 70 N.H. 391, 47 A. 602 (1900); Boone v. Clark, 214 S.W. 607 (Tex. Civ. App. Fort Worth 1919), writ refused, (Oct. 20, 1920); Park Hotel Co. v. Ketchum,  184 Wis. 182, 199 N.W. 219,  33 A.L.R. 351 (1924).

Footnote 85. State v Mayo, 106 Me 62, 75 A 295; Twilley v. Perkins, 77 Md. 252, 26 A. 286 (1893); State v. Skurdal, 235 Mont. 291, 767 P.2d 304 (1988); Boone v. Clark, 214 S.W. 607 (Tex. Civ. App. Fort Worth 1919), writ refused, (Oct. 20, 1920); Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579,  71 A.L.R. 604 (1930).

The state may do whatever is necessary to further safety on the public highways.  State v. Swain, 92 N.C. App. 240, 374 S.E.2d 173 (1988).

Enforcement of motor vehicle laws enacted in the exercise of the state's police power is intended to protect the safety of the users of the state's public ways and other places to which the public has a right of access.Matter of Killam, 388 Mass. 619, 447 N.E.2d 1233 (1983).

Footnote 86.  § 18.

Footnote 87.  § 19.

Footnote 88.  § 22.

Footnote 89.  § 16.

Footnote 90. Levine v. Police Com'n of Town of Fairfield, 28 Conn. App. 344, 612 A.2d 787 (1992), certification denied, 223 Conn. 923, 614 A.2d 823 (1992); Hertz Drivurself Stations v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464,  7 A.L.R.2d 438 (1948).

Footnote 91. Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5,  81 A.L.R. 1543 (1932).

Footnote 92.  §§ 55 et seq.

Footnote 93.  §§ 208 et seq.

Footnote 94.  §§ 244 et seq.

2.  Who May Regulate Motor Vehicles [16-23]

The power of the federal government to regulate interstate commerce 1   gives it control over motor vehicles engaged in business between one state and another in the same degree as such control exists as to any other class of vehicles engaged in the same occupation. 2  Examples of such federal regulation include the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, whose purpose is to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries from traffic accidents by prescribing motor vehicle safety standards for motor vehicles and equipment in interstate commerce, and by undertaking and supporting necessary safety research and development; 3   the Highway Safety Act of 1966, which establishes various programs, such as alcohol awareness programs, to increase highway safety; 4   the National Driver Registry Act, which establishes a central national clearinghouse for information on drivers; 5   the National Motor Vehicle Title Information System, which establishes a national clearinghouse of information on motor vehicle titles; 6   statutes requiring state participation in an international registration plan and an international fuel tax agreement; 7   the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act; 8   the Theft Prevention Act; 9   the Consumer Information Act, which requires the Secretary of Transportation to collect and disseminate information on vehicle safety, crash worthiness, repair costs, operating costs and insurance costs; 10  and the Consumer Product Safety Act, whose purposes are to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury, to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products, to develop uniform safety standards, to minimize conflicting state and local regulations, and to promote research and investigation into the causes and prevention of product-related deaths, illness, and injuries, all with respect to consumer products including motor vehicles. 11    There are also statutes for:  establishing a conference on advanced automotive technologies in order to explore new technologies to improve the competitiveness of the American automobile industry; 12   providing a cash award and medal for advances in motor vehicle research and development; 13   establishing adult education programs to increase the literacy of commercial drivers; 14   and providing for the withholding of apportionments to states that do not meet specified requirements regarding the operation of motor vehicles by intoxicated minors. 15  

Congress, in the exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce, can require a municipality to permit interstate commerce by motor vehicles to pass over its streets. 16      However, Congress has no general power to enact police regulations operative within the territorial limits of a state, and it generally cannot take the power to enact such regulations from the states or attempt any supervision over regulations of the states established under the police power. 17   And the fact that the federal government contributes to the building of roads in a state, or establishes a national park which encompasses a state highway, does not take from the state the power to regulate the use of such roads. 18    But if a subject comes within one of the enumerated powers granted to the federal government by the Constitution of the United States, Congress can legislate concerning the subject to provide regulations similar to those enacted in the states under the police power. 19  

The regulation of motor carriers by the federal government pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Motor Carrier Act, the Commercial Vehicle Safety Act, 20   and the Motor Carrier Safety Act 21   is treated in another article. 22   

The federal government, through acts of Congress, may regulate and control the operation of motor vehicles insofar as they are acting as governmental agencies in performing governmental functions or duties. 23      In this regard, there are several statutes regulating the use of government owned vehicles, 24   requiring safety devices in government owned vehicles, 25   and controlling expenses related to government owned motor vehicles. 26  

Congress has properly delegated to the commissioners of the District of Columbia the power to regulate the movement of vehicles on the public streets thereof. 27

Footnote 1. US Const Art I §  8.

Footnote 2. Adair v. U.S.,  208 U.S. 161,  28 S. Ct. 277,  52 L. Ed. 436 (1908) (overruled in part on other grounds by, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B.,  313 U.S. 177,  61 S. Ct. 845,  85 L. Ed. 1271,  133 A.L.R. 1217 (1941)) and (overruling recognized on other grounds by, Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Intern. Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d 815, 4 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1947, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2868, 97 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 10232 (3d Cir. 1983)) and (overruling recognized on other grounds by, Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,  113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4484, 98 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 55398 (1983)) and (overruling recognized on other grounds by, Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963, 12 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 115 (11th Cir. 1986)) and (overruling recognized on other grounds by, Balsavage v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 461, 139 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2082, 116 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 10238 (D.N.J. 1989)) and (declined to follow on other grounds by, Blue v. McBride, 252 Kan. 894, 850 P.2d 852 (1993)) and (abrogation recognized on other grounds by, Eastern Enterprises v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 1997)).

Footnote 3. 49 USCA §§  30101-30167.

Annotation: Validity and construction of safety standards issued under National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended (15 USC §§  1381 et seq.),  6 A.L.R. Fed. 988.

Judicial review of orders under National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 USCA §§  1381 et seq.),  18 A.L.R. Fed. 610.

Footnote 4. 23 USCA §§  401 et seq.

Footnote 5. 49 USCA §§  30301-30308.

Footnote 6. 49 USCA §§  30501-30505.

Footnote 7. 49 USCA §§  31701-31708.

Footnote 8. 42 USCA §§  7401 et seq., discussed in 61A Am Jur 2d, Pollution Control.

Footnote 9. 49 USCA §§  33101-33118.

Footnote 10. 49 USCA §§  32101,  32102,  32301-32309.

Footnote 11. 15 USCA §§  2051 et seq. discussed in 63B Am Jur 2d, Products Liability §§ 1990 et seq.

Footnote 12. 15 USCA §  3711b.

Footnote 13. 15 USCA §  3711c.

Footnote 14. 20 USCA §  1211b.

Footnote 15. 23 USCA §  161.

Footnote 16. City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.,  357 U.S. 77,  78 S. Ct. 1063,  2 L. Ed. 2d 1174, 24 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 501 (1958).

Footnote 17. U.S. v. Dewitt,  76 U.S. 41,  19 L. Ed. 593 (1869).

Footnote 18.  § 18.

Footnote 19. See 16A Am Jur 2d,  Constitutional Law § 381.

Federal regulation determines how the speed limit on federal roads is to be determined and controls over state law requirements reducing speed limits generally.U.S. v. Wornom, 754 F. Supp. 517 (W.D. Va. 1991).

Footnote 20. 49 USCA §§  31101-31147.

Footnote 21. 49 USCA §§  31501-31504.

Footnote 22. See 13 Am Jur 2d,  Carriers §§ 40,  41.

Footnote 23. Johnson v. State of Maryland,  254 U.S. 51,  41 S. Ct. 16,  65 L. Ed. 126 (1920), holding that a state may not require a post office employee to cease driving a government motor truck in the transportation of mail over a post road until he shall obtain a license by submitting to examination before a state official and paying a fee.

Footnote 24. 40 USCA §  491.

Footnote 25. 40 USCA §§  701-703.

Footnote 26. 40 USCA §§  901-913.

Footnote 27. White v. District of Columbia, 55 App. D.C. 197, 4 F.2d 163 (App.D.C D.C. Cir. 1925).

The Motor Vehicle Safety Act 28   does not generally pre-empt the field of regulation of motor vehicle safety, 29    but it does pre-empt state standards relating to the same subject that are either more or less stringent than the federal standards. 30 Only state statutes that conflict with federal safety standards are pre-empted. 31   Thus, pre-emption should only occur where compliance with both the federal and local regulations is impossible. 32   Moreover, while a state may be pre-empted from establishing its own standards, it is not pre-empted from enforcing the federal standards. 33   Thus, federal safety standards on motorcycle helmets do not pre-empt state laws requiring motorcycle riders to wear helmets, 34  but the state cannot prescribe helmets that differ from those in the federal regulations. 35   State laws requiring proof of compliance with federal standards before automobiles not originally designed for the United States market may be licensed and registered are also not pre-empted by the federal regulations. 36       

Footnote 28. 49 USCA §§  30101-30167.

Footnote 29. Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1969); Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969); People v. Giese,  95 Misc. 2d 792, 408 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1978), order aff'd,  68 A.D.2d 1019, 414 N.Y.S.2d 947 (2d Dep't 1979).

Footnote 30. Sims v. State of Fla., Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20600 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,  493 U.S. 815,  110 S. Ct. 64,  107 L. Ed. 2d 31, 30 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2132 (1989) and cert. denied,  493 U.S. 815,  110 S. Ct. 64,  107 L. Ed. 2d 31, 30 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2133 (1989); People v. Subaru Distributors Corp.,  141 Misc. 2d 723, 534 N.Y.S.2d 305 (J. Ct. 1988).

The Theft Prevention Act pre-empts state or local regulation that is different.  49 USCA §  33118.

Annotation: Validity and construction of safety standards issued under National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended (15 USC §§  1381 et seq.),  6 A.L.R. Fed. 988, § 3[a] (pre-emption of state regulations).

Footnote 31. Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 966 F.2d 777, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13308 (3d Cir. 1992); State v. Oberlton, 262 N.J. Super. 204, 620 A.2d 468 (Law Div. 1992).

Footnote 32. National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 535 F. Supp. 509, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. 20853 (D.R.I. 1982), judgment aff'd, 698 F.2d 559, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. 20451 (1st Cir. 1983); Ruiz v. Commissioner of Dept. of Transp. of City of New York, 679 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), reargument denied, 687 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) and judgment aff'd, 858 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1988); Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 966 F.2d 777, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13308 (3d Cir. 1992); Interstate Towing Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, Ohio, 6 F.3d 1154 (6th Cir. 1993).

Footnote 33. Juvenile Products Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Edmisten, 568 F. Supp. 714 (E.D.N.C. 1983), reconsideration denied, 582 F. Supp. 376 (E.D.N.C. 1983); Direct Auto. Imports Ass'n, Inc. v. Townsley, 804 F.2d 1408, 25 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1337, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. 20507 (5th Cir. 1986); Sims v. State of Fla., Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20600 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,  493 U.S. 815,  110 S. Ct. 64,  107 L. Ed. 2d 31, 30 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2132 (1989) and cert. denied,  493 U.S. 815,  110 S. Ct. 64,  107 L. Ed. 2d 31, 30 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2133 (1989); Bianco v. California Highway Patrol, 24 Cal. App. 4th 1113, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711 (4th Dist. 1994), as modified on denial of reh'g, (May 24, 1994).

Footnote 34. Com. v. Guest, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 941, 425 N.E.2d 779 (1981); Robotham v. State, 241 Neb. 379, 488 N.W.2d 533 (1992).

Footnote 35. Robotham v. State, 241 Neb. 379, 488 N.W.2d 533 (1992).

Footnote 36. Direct Auto. Imports Ass'n, Inc. v. Townsley, 804 F.2d 1408, 25 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1337, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. 20507 (5th Cir. 1986); Sims v. State of Fla., Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20600 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,  493 U.S. 815,  110 S. Ct. 64,  107 L. Ed. 2d 31, 30 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2132 (1989) and cert. denied,  493 U.S. 815,  110 S. Ct. 64,  107 L. Ed. 2d 31, 30 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2133 (1989).

The use of public highways by motor vehicles does not amount to an absolute and unqualified right, 37  but is subject to regulation and control by a state, not only because they operate upon public property, 38   but also under the police power of the state, which it is the legislature's province to exercise in appropriate circumstances. 39   Thus, state legislatures, by virtue of their inherent police powers and plenary jurisdiction over public ways, may enact reasonable regulations governing the conduct of the owners and drivers of vehicles operated thereon, 40  and calculated to promote care on the part of highway users, 41 which regulations may extend to nonresidents as well as residents. 42  And in regulating the use of public highways, the state has traditionally been afforded exceptionally broad discretion. 43

In the exercise of its power to regulate and control the public highways, a state legislature may prohibit the use on the highways of such vehicles as are dangerous to the general traveling public. 44   The legislature cannot, however, prevent citizens from using the public highways in the ordinary manner, and the fact that the vehicle used for the movement of persons or things along the highways is novel will not justify its exclusion. 45

̈ Observation: It has been held that state motor vehicle law may not apply to motor vehicle traffic on private property. 46

The fact that the federal government contributes to or assists the state in the building of highways does not take from or limit the power of the state in the exercise of its police power or other right to regulate and control the use of such highways by vehicular or other traffic. 47   

Footnote 37.  § 10.

Footnote 38. Hertz Drivurself Stations v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464,  7 A.L.R.2d 438 (1948); State v. Bounds, 604 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. 1980).

Footnote 39. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Price, 49 Ariz. 19, 63 P.2d 653,  108 A.L.R. 1156 (1937); Ex parte Schuler, 167 Cal. 282, 139 P. 685 (1914); Ward v. State, 188 Ga. App. 372, 373 S.E.2d 65 (1988); State v. French, 77 Haw. 222, 883 P.2d 644 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994); Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, 74 N.E. 1035 (1905); Com. v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1962); Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S.W.2d 691,  87 A.L.R. 534 (1932); State v Chandler, 131 Me 262, 161 A 148,  82 ALR 1389, app dismd  287 US 572,  77 L Ed 502,  53 S Ct 116; Com. v. Howie, 354 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 373 (1968), cert. denied,  393 U.S. 999,  89 S. Ct. 485,  21 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1968); Ex parte Kneedler, 243 Mo. 632, 147 S.W. 983 (1912); Kostyk v. Com., Dept. of Transp., 131 Pa. Commw. 455, 570 A.2d 644 (1990); Blow v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 83 S.D. 628, 164 N.W.2d 351 (1969); City of Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d 981 (Utah 1987); Blumenthal v. City of Cheyenne, 64 Wyo. 75, 186 P.2d 556 (1947).

State has police power to promulgate regulations calculated to promote safety in the use of highways.  Satterlee v. State, 289 Ark. 450, 711 S.W.2d 827 (1986).

As to the source of police power generally, see 16A Am Jur 2d,  Constitutional Law §§ 360,  361.

Footnote 40. Findley v. Justice Court for Kern River Judicial Dist. of Kern County, 62 Cal. App. 3d 566, 133 Cal. Rptr. 241 (5th Dist. 1976); Ward v. State, 188 Ga. App. 372, 373 S.E.2d 65 (1988); People v. Blackorby, 146 Ill. 2d 307, 166 Ill. Dec. 902, 586 N.E.2d 1231 (1992); Com. v. Kautz, 341 Pa. Super. 374, 491 A.2d 864 (1985), appeal denied, (Oct. 29, 1985); Shumpert v. South Carolina Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 306 S.C. 64, 409 S.E.2d 771 (1991).

Pursuant to its police power, a state may regulate the operation of motor vehicles for the safety and order of the general public.  State v. French, 77 Haw. 222, 883 P.2d 644 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994).

Power to regulate parking is part of the police power of the state.  Levine v. Police Com'n of Town of Fairfield, 28 Conn. App. 344, 612 A.2d 787 (1992), certification denied, 223 Conn. 923, 614 A.2d 823 (1992).

Footnote 41. Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620,  35 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1952) (overruled in part on other grounds by, Stauffer v. Weedlun, 188 Neb. 105, 195 N.W.2d 218 (1972)); Matter of Hansen, 298 N.W.2d 816 (S.D. 1980).

The motor vehicle code was promulgated to increase the safety and efficiency of the public roads.  City of Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d 981 (Utah 1987).

State laws requiring motorcycle riders to wear helmets have generally been upheld as valid safety requirements that affect not only the rider but society as a whole.  Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,  493 U.S. 920,  110 S. Ct. 283,  107 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1989); Buhl v. Hannigan, 16 Cal. App. 4th 1612, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 2 A.D.D. 421, 2 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1385 (4th Dist. 1993), as modified, (July 15, 1993) and (holding limited on other grounds by, Bianco v. California Highway Patrol, 24 Cal. App. 4th 1113, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 711 (4th Dist. 1994)); Hamm v. State, 387 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1980); Com. v. Guest, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 941, 425 N.E.2d 779 (1981); Robotham v. State, 241 Neb. 379, 488 N.W.2d 533 (1992); State v. Eight Judicial Dist. Court, In and For State, Clark County, 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022 (1985); Benning v. State, 161 Vt. 472, 641 A.2d 757 (1994).

Footnote 42. Wuchter v. Pizzutti,  276 U.S. 13,  48 S. Ct. 259,  72 L. Ed. 446,  57 A.L.R. 1230 (1928); Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S.W.2d 691,  87 A.L.R. 534 (1932); State v Chandler, 131 Me 262, 161 A 148,  82 ALR 1389, app dismd  287 US 572,  77 L Ed 502,  53 S Ct 116; State v. Justesen, 63 Or. App. 544, 665 P.2d 380 (1983), review denied, 295 Or. 840, 671 P.2d 1176 (1983); C. I. T. Corp. v. W. J. Crosby & Co., 175 Va. 16, 7 S.E.2d 107 (1940).

As to application of regulations to vehicles in interstate traffic, see  § 27.

Footnote 43. State v. French, 77 Haw. 222, 883 P.2d 644 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994); People v. Blackorby, 146 Ill. 2d 307, 166 Ill. Dec. 902, 586 N.E.2d 1231 (1992).

Footnote 44. Twilley v. Perkins, 77 Md. 252, 26 A. 286 (1893); Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542, 85 N.E. 848 (1908); State v. Yopp, 97 N.C. 477, 2 S.E. 458 (1887).

Footnote 45. People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913).

Footnote 46. Commodities Export Co. v. City of Detroit, 116 Mich. App. 57, 321 N.W.2d 842 (1982).

Footnote 47. Morris v. Duby,  274 U.S. 135,  47 S. Ct. 548,  71 L. Ed. 966 (1927).

The police power of the state to regulate and control the use of its highways may be delegated to municipalities for exercise by them in the interest of public safety and the promotion of the general welfare. 48   A municipality to which the power to regulate the use of its streets has been delegated by constitutional provision or legislative enactment may adopt regulations governing the operation of motor vehicles within its limits, provided such regulations are reasonable, 49   and are not in conflict with the principles of constitutional law 50   or valid statutes governing the subject. 51  But a city may not attempt to regulate beyond its jurisdiction. 52

̈ Observation: Any power delegated to cities to regulate traffic in their jurisdiction is strictly construed. 53

The grant of authority to a local government to regulate traffic is not exclusive and will not preclude state law. 54    Moreover, a state may withdraw its delegation of authority to a city to regulate traffic. 55

By the enactment of a general law covering a specific phase of motor vehicle regulation, the state may impliedly deprive local authorities of the power to pass ordinances which would be inconsistent with such law. 56   However, simply because a state undertakes to impose certain regulations applicable to the entire state, a municipality is not necessarily deprived of the power of imposing other regulations adapted to its own peculiar conditions, if these are not inconsistent with those of a general character prescribed for the entire state. 57   Moreover, a state statute may expressly give a city authority to regulate in a certain area and indicate that the city's regulatory authority supersedes any inconsistent state law provisions. 58    

There is some support for the view that there is an implied grant of police power to every municipality organized under the laws of a state, unless the legislature has provided that municipal corporations shall have only such powers as are expressly conferred upon them by statute. 59   Where the latter provision is made, it must appear, in order to find authority of a municipality to adopt an ordinance regulating the use of automobiles, that a charter provision or statute exists which is broad enough to cover the terms of the ordinance. 60 

Footnote 48. Harris County Wrecker Owners for Equal Opportunity v. City of Houston, 943 F. Supp. 711 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Transus, Inc. v. City of Dothan, 497 So. 2d 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986); Duval Lumber Co. v. Slade, 147 Fla. 137, 2 So. 2d 371 (1941); Chicago Park Dist. v. Canfield, 370 Ill. 447, 19 N.E.2d 376,  121 A.L.R. 557 (1939); City of Tell City v. Noble, 489 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1986), reh'g denied, (Apr. 23, 1986) and transfer denied, (July 7, 1986) and (abrogation on other grounds recognized by, Board of Com'rs of Adams County v. Price, 587 N.E.2d 1326 (Ind. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1992)); City of Cedar Rapids v. State, 478 N.W.2d 602 (Iowa 1991); Wes-T-Erre Development Corp. v. Terrebonne Parish, Through Police Jury of Terrebonne Parish, 416 So. 2d 209 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writ denied, 421 So. 2d 251 (La. 1982); Twilley v. Perkins, 77 Md. 252, 26 A. 286 (1893); City of East Lansing v. Yocca, 142 Mich. App. 491, 369 N.W.2d 918 (1985); State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Robinson v. Indianola Mun. Separate School Dist., 467 So. 2d 911, 24 Ed. Law Rep. 1077 (Miss. 1985); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. City of St. Louis, 663 S.W.2d 408, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 323 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1983); Chapman v. Luna, 101 N.M. 59, 678 P.2d 687, 20 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2170 (1984); Wenco Management Co. v. Town of Carrboro, 53 N.C. App. 480, 281 S.E.2d 74 (1981); State v. Parker, 68 Ohio St. 3d 283, 626 N.E.2d 106 (1994); Cabell v. City of Cottage Grove, 170 Or. 256, 130 P.2d 1013,  144 A.L.R. 286 (1942); South Dakota Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. South Dakota Dept. of Transp., 305 N.W.2d 682 (S.D. 1981); Scurlock Permian Corp. v. Brazos County, 869 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1993), reh'g denied, (Dec. 23, 1993) and writ denied, (Apr. 13, 1994); Town of East Troy v. A-1 Service Co., Inc.,  196 Wis. 2d 120, 537 N.W.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1995).

Unless expressly provided by legislature, city has no authority over vehicular traffic control.  Rumford v. City of Berkeley, 31 Cal. 3d 545, 183 Cal. Rptr. 73, 645 P.2d 124 (1982).

State may delegate power to regulate parking on public streets to municipal subdivisions.  People v. Garth, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1797, 286 Cal. Rptr. 451 (2d Dist. 1991), review denied, (Jan. 16, 1992); Levine v. Police Com'n of Town of Fairfield, 28 Conn. App. 344, 612 A.2d 787 (1992), certification denied, 223 Conn. 923, 614 A.2d 823 (1992); Cedar Grove Tp. v. Sheridan, 209 N.J. Super. 267, 507 A.2d 304 (App. Div. 1986), certification denied, 104 N.J. 464, 517 A.2d 448 (1986); Wilson v. City of Waynesville, 615 S.W.2d 640 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1981); Associated Students of University of Montana v. City of Missoula, 261 Mont. 231, 862 P.2d 380, 87 Ed. Law Rep. 268 (1993); City of Orlando v. Cullom, 400 So. 2d 513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1981), review denied, 411 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1981).

Footnote 49.  § 24.

Footnote 50.  § 24.

Footnote 51. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Guenther,  281 U.S. 34,  50 S. Ct. 165,  74 L. Ed. 683,  72 A.L.R. 1064 (1930); Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 P. 442,  21 A.L.R. 1172 (1920); People v. Schneider, 139 Mich. 673, 103 N.W. 172 (1905); Roper v. Greenspon, 272 Mo. 288, 198 S.W. 1107 (1917); People v. Murphy,  169 Misc. 2d 357, 649 N.Y.S.2d 962 (App. Term 1996); Schell v. Du Bois, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664 (1916); Brazier v. City of Philadelphia, 215 Pa. 297, 64 A. 508 (1906).

As to conflict between statutes and local regulations, see  § 21.

Footnote 52. City of East Lansing v. Yocca, 142 Mich. App. 491, 369 N.W.2d 918 (1985).

Footnote 53. Carsten v. City of Del Mar, 8 Cal. App. 4th 1642, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252 (4th Dist. 1992).

Footnote 54. People v. Murphy,  169 Misc. 2d 357, 649 N.Y.S.2d 962 (App. Term 1996).

Footnote 55. Trailways, Inc. v. City of Atlantic City, 179 N.J. Super. 258, 431 A.2d 191 (Law Div. 1980).

Footnote 56. Brazier v. City of Philadelphia, 215 Pa. 297, 64 A. 508 (1906).

Footnote 57. City of Tell City v. Noble, 489 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1986), reh'g denied, (Apr. 23, 1986) and transfer denied, (July 7, 1986) and (abrogation on other grounds recognized by, Board of Com'rs of Adams County v. Price, 587 N.E.2d 1326 (Ind. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1992)); Mahoney v. Maxfield, 102 Minn. 377, 113 N.W. 904 (1907); Brazier v. City of Philadelphia, 215 Pa. 297, 64 A. 508 (1906); State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936).

A city may adopt an ordinance incorporating a state statute.  City of Salem v. Jungblut, 83 Or. App. 540, 732 P.2d 919 (1987).

Footnote 58. Corona Ready Mix, Inc. v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles Traffic Violations Bureau Appeals Bd.,  226 A.D.2d 630, 641 N.Y.S.2d 128 (2d Dep't 1996) (weight restrictions); Burke v. Santoro,  172 A.D.2d 579, 568 N.Y.S.2d 144 (2d Dep't 1991) (pedestrian traffic).

Footnote 59. 56 Am Jur 2d,  Municipal Corporations, Counties, and other Political Subdivisions §§ 194,  427.

Footnote 60. City of Chicago v. Banker, 112 Ill. App. 94 (1st Dist. 1904); Ex parte Epperson, 61 Tex. Crim. 237, 134 S.W. 685 (1911).

Home rule power gives cities police power to regulate vehicle traffic.  Executive Town & Country Services, Inc. v. Young, 258 Ga. 860, 376 S.E.2d 190 (1989).

A municipality's power to regulate traffic is derived from its police power.  West Bradford Tp. v. Strasburg Associates, 72 Pa. Commw. 634, 457 A.2d 197 (1983).

A municipality's power to enact or adopt traffic regulations is limited by the state legislation conferring such power.  Town of East Troy v. A-1 Service Co., Inc.,  196 Wis. 2d 120, 537 N.W.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1995).

Under properly delegated legislative authority, a municipality may enact such ordinances governing the use of its streets by bicycles and tricycles as are necessary, in its judgment, to protect the public. 61   Thus, a municipal ordinance may prohibit riding bicycles on the sidewalks. 62   The public safety and convenience may require regulations of this character, but they must not, unless made by virtue of specific authority, be unreasonable, or improperly in restraint of the exercise of personal rights or of the lawful use of private property. 63

Footnote 61. City of Des Moines v. Keller, 116 Iowa 648, 88 N.W. 827 (1902); Twilley v. Perkins, 77 Md. 252, 26 A. 286 (1893); State v. Yopp, 97 N.C. 477, 2 S.E. 458 (1887); Gagnier v. City of Fargo, 11 N.D. 73, 88 N.W. 1030 (1902).

Footnote 62. McCrimmon v. State, 505 So. 2d 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1987); Schallenberger v. Rudd, 244 Kan. 230, 767 P.2d 841 (1989).

Footnote 63. Moore v. District of Columbia, 12 App. D.C. 537 (App.D.C D.C. Cir. 1898).

Municipalities to which the power to regulate the use of their public ways by motor vehicles has been delegated by statute may enact such regulations so long as they are not in conflict with or repugnant to state legislative enactments governing the use of such vehicles; 64   but such regulations are invalid if they are in conflict with statutes relating to the subject. 65   

Where the state has retained the power to provide general laws regulating traffic on the highways of the state, legislation enacted pursuant to such right cannot be curtailed, infringed upon, or annulled by local authorities, 66  and where there is conflict between such a state statute and a municipal ordinance, the statute prevails. 67    This rule applies even in a jurisdiction where the municipality is granted the authority under the constitution to make and enforce laws respecting municipal affairs, subject only to the provisions of its charter, the regulation of traffic not being deemed a "municipal affair" within the meaning of the constitutional grant of authority. 68    On the other hand, if the state statute, fairly construed, does not purport to be exclusive of the power of a municipality to make and enforce traffic regulations for the municipality, the fact that the municipal regulations are more stringent than the traffic regulations provided by statute does not invalidate them. 69

Whether or not a local government may enact an ordinance at variance with a state statute depends on whether the state intended to pre-empt the field. 70    Generally, an ordinance should stand unless there is an actual conflict between the ordinance and the statute or unless the legislature has clearly pre-empted the field so as to preclude any municipal actions. 71   A conflict exists when the local regulation is facially inconsistent with the state law, 72  such as when the ordinance prohibits an act permitted by statute or permits an act prohibited by statute. 73

The matter of conflict between state and local regulations is further considered in reference to specific regulations discussed in subsequent sections of the article.

Footnote 64.  § 19.

Footnote 65. Morris v. Crumpton, 259 Ala. 565, 67 So. 2d 800,  39 A.L.R.2d 58 (1953); Bailey v. Lenord, 625 P.2d 849 (Alaska 1981); People v. Garth, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1797, 286 Cal. Rptr. 451 (2d Dist. 1991), review denied, (Jan. 16, 1992); Pacific Intern. Services Corp. v. Hurip, 76 Haw. 209, 873 P.2d 88 (Haw. 1994); Village of Wilmette v. Michels, 137 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 92 Ill. Dec. 615, 485 N.E.2d 426 (1st Dist. 1985); Hobble By and Through Hobble v. Basham, 575 N.E.2d 693 (Ind. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1991); City of Tell City v. Noble, 489 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1986), reh'g denied, (Apr. 23, 1986) and transfer denied, (July 7, 1986) and (abrogation on other grounds recognized by, Board of Com'rs of Adams County v. Price, 587 N.E.2d 1326 (Ind. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1992)); City of Wichita v. Basgall, 257 Kan. 631, 894 P.2d 876, 10 A.D.D. 887, 4 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 533 (1995); American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Park Com'n of City of Brockton, 412 Mass. 753, 592 N.E.2d 1314 (1992); Poe v. City of Detroit, 179 Mich. App. 564, 446 N.W.2d 523 (1989), appeal denied, (Dec. 5, 1990); State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. City of St. Louis, 663 S.W.2d 408, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 323 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1983); Chapman v. Luna, 101 N.M. 59, 678 P.2d 687, 20 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2170 (1984); City of University Heights v. Milton, 55 Ohio App. 3d 145, 563 N.E.2d 42 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1988), jurisdictional motion overruled, 42 Ohio St. 3d 714, 538 N.E.2d 1065 (1989); El Paso Electric Co. v. Collins, 23 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930), reh'g denied, 25 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930); Western Auto Transports v. City of Cheyenne, 57 Wyo. 351, 118 P.2d 761 (1941), reh'g denied, 57 Wyo. 351, 120 P.2d 590 (1942).

Footnote 66. Winters v. Bisaillon, 152 Or. 578, 54 P.2d 1169 (1936).

By enacting state statute providing that no local authority may enact an ordinance on matters covered by the code unless expressly authorized, the Legislature has declared an intent to pre-empt the field of vehicular traffic control.  People v. Stone, 190 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 236 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1987).

Footnote 67. Bailey v. Lenord, 625 P.2d 849 (Alaska 1981); Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482,  147 A.L.R. 515 (1942); Pacific Intern. Services Corp. v. Hurip, 76 Haw. 209, 873 P.2d 88 (Haw. 1994); Village of Oakwood Hills v. Diamond, 125 Ill. App. 3d 58, 80 Ill. Dec. 550, 465 N.E.2d 662 (2d Dist. 1984); City of Des Moines v. Gruen, 457 N.W.2d 340 (Iowa 1990); Strode v. Director of Revenue, 724 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. 1987).

Where state legislation set school zone speed limit, local authorities are prohibited from altering it.  People v. Goodrich, 33 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 154, 97 Ed. Law Rep. 1116 (1994).

Municipality may not alter speed limit for road that has been set by statute.  Rose v. Village of Peninsula, 839 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Ohio 1993), related reference, 875 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Ohio 1995).

Footnote 68. Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482,  147 A.L.R. 515 (1942).

Footnote 69. Ham v. Los Angeles County, 46 Cal. App. 148, 189 P. 462 (2d Dist. 1920); City of Des Moines v. Gruen, 457 N.W.2d 340 (Iowa 1990).

Footnote 70. City of Seattle v. Williams, 128 Wash. 2d 341, 908 P.2d 359 (1995).

State legislation addressing vehicle rental practices, including regulations imposed on all motor vehicles, does not set forth sufficiently comprehensive scheme of regulation to pre-empt further legislation in field by municipalities.  Hertz Corp. v. City of New York,  80 N.Y.2d 565, 592 N.Y.S.2d 637, 607 N.E.2d 784 (1992).

Footnote 71. Pacific Intern. Services Corp. v. Hurip, 76 Haw. 209, 873 P.2d 88 (Haw. 1994); City of Wichita v. Basgall, 257 Kan. 631, 894 P.2d 876, 10 A.D.D. 887, 4 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 533 (1995).

Footnote 72. American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Park Com'n of City of Brockton, 412 Mass. 753, 592 N.E.2d 1314 (1992).

Footnote 73. Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency v. City of Grimes, 495 N.W.2d 746 (Iowa 1993); Seattle Taxi, Inc. v. King County, 49 Wash. App. 617, 744 P.2d 1082 (1987), review denied, (Dec. 2, 1987).

A statute or ordinance placing discretionary power in an administrative agency must furnish standards for those who administer such power. 74    Accordingly, legislative power to promulgate regulations governing motor vehicles and traffic upon public ways cannot be delegated to administrative officers or boards, to be exercised in their uncontrolled discretion. 75   However, no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to regulate motor vehicles and traffic upon public ways is involved in leaving it to the discretion of administrative officers or boards to accomplish in detail what is authorized or required by the law in general terms, so long as such discretion is limited with clearly defined standards and policies to be implemented; 76  and there are many regulations respecting motor vehicles and traffic upon public ways which may be prescribed or promulgated by a public officer or board acting under powers granted by the legislature. 77  Courts will generally uphold provisions permitting public officers or boards to determine conditions under which a law respecting motor vehicles or traffic upon public ways may or may not apply or to alter such regulations to meet peculiar local conditions. 78     

The exercise of functions of a ministerial character in connection with motor vehicle and traffic regulation may be delegated by the legislature to the highway department, 79  to a state department of transportation, 80  to the motor vehicle commissioner or administration, 81  to park commissioners, 82  to police boards, 83   or to the such other public officers or boards as it deems fit. 84    To the extent that the legislature has the power to delegate the power to perform an administrative function to a board or commission, it has also the power to revoke or change such delegation. 85    However, local power to regulate cannot be taken away and conferred on another authority without clear statutory expression. 86

The fact that there is no provision for an appeal from the action of public authorities in promulgating regulations respecting motor vehicles or traffic upon public ways does not necessarily render them invalid. 87  

Footnote 74. 2 Am Jur 2d,  Administrative Law § 56.

Footnote 75. Cicero Lumber Co. v. Town of Cicero, 176 Ill. 9, 51 N.E. 758 (1898); Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579,  71 A.L.R. 604 (1930).

Footnote 76. People v. Peterson, 734 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1987); Springfield Park Dist. v. Buckley, 140 Ill. App. 3d 524, 94 Ill. Dec. 824, 488 N.E.2d 1071 (4th Dist. 1986); State v. Basham, 60 Ohio App. 3d 69, 573 N.E.2d 773 (1st Dist.Hamilton County 1989); Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579,  71 A.L.R. 604 (1930); State v. Wetzel,  208 Wis. 603, 243 N.W. 768,  86 A.L.R. 274 (1932).

Footnote 77. Sproles v. Binford,  286 U.S. 374,  52 S. Ct. 581,  76 L. Ed. 1167 (1932); Ex parte Hinkelman, 183 Cal. 392, 191 P. 682,  11 A.L.R. 1222 (1920); Harder's Fireproof Storage & Van Co. v. City of Chicago, 235 Ill. 58, 85 N.E. 245 (1908); Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S.W.2d 691,  87 A.L.R. 534 (1932); Smith v. State, 130 Md. 482, 100 A. 778 (1917); Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542, 85 N.E. 848 (1908); Interstate Trucking Co. v. Dammann,  208 Wis. 116, 241 N.W. 625,  82 A.L.R. 1080 (1932).

Footnote 78. Sproles v. Binford,  286 U.S. 374,  52 S. Ct. 581,  76 L. Ed. 1167 (1932); Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S.W.2d 691,  87 A.L.R. 534 (1932).

Footnote 79. People v. Peterson, 734 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1987).

Footnote 80. American Bus Lines, Inc. v. Arizona Corp. Commission, 129 Ariz. 595, 633 P.2d 404 (1981); State v. Moore, 259 Ga. 139, 376 S.E.2d 877 (1989); Dartez v. Powell Oil Co., 499 So. 2d 1046 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986).

Footnote 81. State v. Anonymous, 36 Conn. Supp. 551, 421 A.2d 867 (Super. Ct. Appellate Sess. 1980); Department of Transp., Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 474 A.2d 191, 20 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2113, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20179 (1984).

Footnote 82. Shanks v. Forsyth County Park Authority, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1231 (M.D.N.C. 1994); Springfield Park Dist. v. Buckley, 140 Ill. App. 3d 524, 94 Ill. Dec. 824, 488 N.E.2d 1071 (4th Dist. 1986); American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Park Com'n of City of Brockton, 412 Mass. 753, 592 N.E.2d 1314 (1992).

Footnote 83. Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N.E. 224 (1889).

As to police officers, see  § 23.

Footnote 84. People ex rel. Curren v. Schommer, 392 Ill. 17, 63 N.E.2d 744,  167 A.L.R. 1347 (1945); State v. Weber, 88 Kan. 175, 127 P. 536 (1912); Molony-Vierstra v. Michigan State University, 417 Mich. 224, 331 N.W.2d 473, 10 Ed. Law Rep. 359 (1983).

Footnote 85. Illinois Malleable Iron Co. v. Commissioners of Lincoln Park, 263 Ill. 446, 105 N.E. 336 (1914); City of Canton v. Canton Cotton Warehouse Co., 84 Miss. 268, 36 So. 266 (1904); Cabell v. City of Cottage Grove, 170 Or. 256, 130 P.2d 1013,  144 A.L.R. 286 (1942); Brand v. Multnomah County, 38 Or. 79, 60 P. 390 (1900), aff'd, 38 Or. 79, 62 P. 209 (1900).

Footnote 86. State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N.E. 252 (1889); Robinson v. Indianola Mun. Separate School Dist., 467 So. 2d 911, 24 Ed. Law Rep. 1077 (Miss. 1985) (declined to follow on other grounds by, Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Com'n v. Bibb County School Dist., 222 Ga. App. 264, 474 S.E.2d 70, 111 Ed. Law Rep. 1382 (1996)).

Footnote 87. Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S.W.2d 691,  87 A.L.R. 534 (1932).

There is some question as to the extent to which the power to direct traffic upon the public ways may be delegated to police officers. 88   In any event, an ordinance which imposes upon police officers the duty of enforcing the provisions of a traffic ordinance, but gives them the discretion to direct traffic as public safety or convenience may demand in times of an emergency, 89  or to expedite traffic or safeguard pedestrians, 90  is valid and constitutional, and is not open to the objection that it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to police officers, or that it deprives motorists of their liberty without due process of law.  Such an ordinance is upheld on the theory that the subject is one which does not admit of rigid or fixed regulations which will operate automatically and with entire impartiality without the intervention of a directing intelligence. 91    In some instances, however, provisions conferring such power of direction have been declared invalid upon the ground that they vested in the officer an unnecessary discretion and power of discrimination. 92

Footnote 88. City of Cleveland v. Gustafson, 124 Ohio St. 607, 11 Ohio L. Abs. 416, 180 N.E. 59,  79 A.L.R. 1325 (1932).

Footnote 89. City of Chicago v. Marriotto, 332 Ill. 44, 163 N.E. 369,  60 A.L.R. 501 (1928); Com. v. Harrison, 183 Pa. Super. 133, 130 A.2d 198 (1957).

Footnote 90. Com. v. Harrison, 183 Pa. Super. 133, 130 A.2d 198 (1957).

Footnote 91. City of Chicago v. Marriotto, 332 Ill. 44, 163 N.E. 369,  60 A.L.R. 501 (1928).

Footnote 92. City of St. Louis v. Allen, 275 Mo. 501, 204 S.W. 1083 (1918).

3.  Validity of Regulations [24-27]

In common with other police regulations, 93 statutes and ordinances regulating vehicles and their use on the public highways and streets must be reasonable. 94  Moreover, the regulation must be reasonably related to a proper legislative goal. 95    

Whether such a statute or ordinance is reasonable is to be determined in view of the general conditions existing at the time the question arises, 96  and neither exact precision nor scientific calculation is essential to render regulations of highway traffic reasonable. 97  Such regulations may be reasonable notwithstanding that they operate harshly against particular persons, 98  and, generally speaking, the burden of showing that they are unreasonable is on those who deny their validity. 99      

̈ Observation: Traffic ordinances are presumed to be valid. 1    

Statutes and ordinances regulating vehicles and their use on the public highways and streets must also be definite in specifying the conduct which is condemned or prohibited, to the end that the persons concerned may know how to comply with the requirements of the statutes. 2    

In determining the validity of local traffic regulations, it is necessary to balance the effect of the ordinance in promoting health, safety and welfare of the community against the hardships and difficulties it causes to individuals.  An evidentiary hearing may be required. 3    But in making such determinations, the courts will take judicial notice of matters of common knowledge. 4  

Footnote 93. As to the necessity of the reasonableness of a regulation under the police power, generally, see 16A Am Jur 2d,  Constitutional Law §§ 384,  385.

Footnote 94. People v. Blackorby, 146 Ill. 2d 307, 166 Ill. Dec. 902, 586 N.E.2d 1231 (1992); Bundrick v. Lafayette Parish Police Jury, 462 So. 2d 1319 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1985); State v. Folda, 267 Mont. 523, 885 P.2d 426 (1994); Board of Trustees of Inc. Village of Mineola v. Incorporated Village of East Williston,  232 A.D.2d 443, 648 N.Y.S.2d 170 (2d Dep't 1996); Cohen v. Board of Trustees of Incorporated Village of Flower Hill,  198 A.D.2d 468, 604 N.Y.S.2d 961 (2d Dep't 1993), leave to appeal denied; Adrian v. Village of St. Paris, 12 Ohio App. 3d 71, 12, 465 N.E.2d 1356 (2d Dist.Champaign County 1983); Ticknor v. Seattle-Renton Stage Line, 139 Wash. 354, 247 P. 1,  47 A.L.R. 252 (1926).

Footnote 95. People v. Elkins, 12 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504 (1992); Levine v. Police Com'n of Town of Fairfield, 28 Conn. App. 344, 612 A.2d 787 (1992), certification denied, 223 Conn. 923, 614 A.2d 823 (1992); People v. Strawn, 210 Ill. App. 3d 783, 155 Ill. Dec. 269, 569 N.E.2d 269 (4th Dist. 1991), appeal denied, 141 Ill. 2d 557, 162 Ill. Dec. 505, 580 N.E.2d 131 (1991); Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency v. City of Grimes, 495 N.W.2d 746 (Iowa 1993); Robinson Tp. v. Board of County Road Com'rs of Ottawa County, 114 Mich. App. 405, 319 N.W.2d 589 (1982); American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. City of St. Louis, 622 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1981); Robotham v. State, 241 Neb. 379, 488 N.W.2d 533 (1992); State v. Fazekas, 238 N.J. Super. 403, 569 A.2d 913 (Law Div. 1989); People v. Jabaar,  163 Misc. 2d 1045, 623 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Village Ct. 1994); State v. Swain, 92 N.C. App. 240, 374 S.E.2d 173 (1988); Toledo v. Wacenske, 95 Ohio App. 3d 282, 642 N.E.2d 407 (6th Dist.Lucas County 1994), dismissed, appeal not allowed, 71 Ohio St. 3d 1404, 641 N.E.2d 202 (1994); Kostyk v. Com., Dept. of Transp., 131 Pa. Commw. 455, 570 A.2d 644 (1990).

Traffic control and safety are substantial governmental goals, legitimate interests of a municipality and rational bases for the exercise of police power.  Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. City of Houston, 620 S.W.2d 833, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2043 (Tex. Civ. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1981).

In action challenging the constitutionality of anticruising ordinances, municipalities satisfactorily demonstrated that cruising ordinances were not unconstitutionally broad, based on findings that cruising ordinances were narrowly tailored to deal with unquestioned problems associated with cruising, ordinances were limited in time to those hours of day where cruising was shown to be problem, they were limited to those streets where municipalities experienced cruising, they set forth standards for cruising–three vehicular passes of control point within two-hour period–and there were numerous exceptions for vehicles operating with governmental or business purposes.  Brandmiller v. Arreola,  199 Wis. 2d 528, 544 N.W.2d 894 (1996).

Annotation: Validity, construction, and effect of statutes or ordinances forbidding automotive "cruising"–practice of driving repeatedly through loop of public roads through city,  87 A.L.R.4th 1110.

Footnote 96. Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678,  49 A.L.R. 1402 (1926); City of Seattle v. Larkin, 10 Wash. App. 205, 516 P.2d 1083 (1973).

To establish that an enactment is unreasonable, it must be shown that it is arbitrary, and that there is no reasonable relation between the end sought and the means used to achieve that end.  Peconic Ave. Businessmens' Ass'n v. Town of Brookhaven,  98 A.D.2d 772, 469 N.Y.S.2d 483 (2d Dep't 1983); People v. Jabaar,  163 Misc. 2d 1045, 623 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Village Ct. 1994).

Footnote 97. South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros.,  303 U.S. 177,  58 S. Ct. 510,  82 L. Ed. 734 (1938); State v. Moore, 259 Ga. 139, 376 S.E.2d 877 (1989); Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S.W.2d 691,  87 A.L.R. 534 (1932).

Footnote 98. Department of Transp. v. Georgia Min. Ass'n, 252 Ga. 128, 311 S.E.2d 443 (1984); Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency v. City of Grimes, 495 N.W.2d 746 (Iowa 1993).

Footnote 99. Department of Transp. v. Georgia Min. Ass'n, 252 Ga. 128, 311 S.E.2d 443 (1984); Springfield Park Dist. v. Buckley, 140 Ill. App. 3d 524, 94 Ill. Dec. 824, 488 N.E.2d 1071 (4th Dist. 1986); Twilley v. Perkins, 77 Md. 252, 26 A. 286 (1893); Robinson Tp. v. Board of County Road Com'rs of Ottawa County, 114 Mich. App. 405, 319 N.W.2d 589 (1982); American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. City of St. Louis, 622 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1981); Peconic Ave. Businessmens' Ass'n v. Town of Brookhaven,  98 A.D.2d 772, 469 N.Y.S.2d 483 (2d Dep't 1983); City of Cincinnati v. Welty, 64 Ohio St. 2d 28, 18 Ohio Op. 3d 211, 413 N.E.2d 1177 (1980), cert. denied,  451 U.S. 939,  101 S. Ct. 2019,  68 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1981); Brandmiller v. Arreola,  199 Wis. 2d 528, 544 N.W.2d 894 (1996).

Footnote 1. Wenco Management Co. v. Town of Carrboro, 53 N.C. App. 480, 281 S.E.2d 74 (1981); City of Cincinnati v. Welty, 64 Ohio St. 2d 28, 18 Ohio Op. 3d 211, 413 N.E.2d 1177 (1980), cert. denied,  451 U.S. 939,  101 S. Ct. 2019,  68 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1981).

Footnote 2. Weil v. McClough, 618 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); State v. Deese, 495 So. 2d 286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1986); City of Wichita v. Basgall, 257 Kan. 631, 894 P.2d 876, 10 A.D.D. 887, 4 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 533 (1995); State v. Dillon, 670 So. 2d 278 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996); State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Baugus v. Director of Revenue, 878 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1994); Robotham v. State, 241 Neb. 379, 488 N.W.2d 533 (1992); People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y. 138, 183 N.E. 273,  86 A.L.R. 1266 (1932); State v. Beyer, 441 N.W.2d 919 (N.D. 1989); City of Portland v. Arndorfer, 44 Or. App. 37, 604 P.2d 1279 (1980); Benning v. State, 161 Vt. 472, 641 A.2d 757 (1994).

Annotation: Statute prohibiting reckless driving:  Definiteness and certainty,  52 A.L.R.4th 1161.

Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity,  6 A.L.R.3d 1326.

Footnote 3. White Plains Automotive Supply Co., Inc. v. City of Peekskill,  98 A.D.2d 776, 469 N.Y.S.2d 487 (2d Dep't 1983).

Footnote 4. City of Chicago v. Rhine, 363 Ill. 619, 2 N.E.2d 905,  105 A.L.R. 1045 (1936) (congestion of street traffic in certain districts).

Statutes and ordinances regulating vehicles and their operation upon the public ways must not unjustly discriminate between individuals or classes. 5   However, the applicability of such laws may be limited in accordance with a reasonable classification of persons, subjects, or places. 6   Thus, for safety purposes, users of the highways may constitutionally be classified according to the character and extent of their use, and, if so classified, may be subjected to regulation. 7   Also, a classification having a basis in practical convenience is not unconstitutional because it may be lacking in purely theoretical or scientific uniformity. 8       Because most traffic ordinances do not create a suspect classification, 9   the classifications will be upheld so long as they bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 10    

Motor vehicles have been recognized as properly and reasonably forming a separate class of instrumentalities for legislative purposes. 11   Accordingly, a statute or ordinance is not unconstitutional as being special legislation merely because it legislates solely upon the question of the operation of automobiles, and does not attempt to regulate the operation of all vehicles using the public highways. 12   Separate classifications for motorcycles have been upheld in many circumstances, 13  although prohibitions of motorcycles on park roads have sometimes been struck down as unconstitutional classifications. 14

Separate classification of snowmobiles has also been upheld. 15

Buses form a separate and distinct class of conveyance, and therefore regulation of such vehicles is not discriminatory because streetcars, taxicabs, and the like, are excluded from their operation. 16    So too, as a general rule, "jitneys" may be subjected to different regulations than those applicable to privately owned automobiles, 17  although an ordinance prohibiting jitneys has been held to be unconstitutional classification on the ground that it bore no substantial relationship to traffic safety. 18

A distinction may also be made between private carriers who transport their own property for compensation and those who transport their own property without compensation. 19         

Footnote 5. Wilson v. City of Waynesville, 615 S.W.2d 640 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1981); Board of Trustees of Inc. Village of Mineola v. Incorporated Village of East Williston,  232 A.D.2d 443, 648 N.Y.S.2d 170 (2d Dep't 1996); State v. Swain, 92 N.C. App. 240, 374 S.E.2d 173 (1988); Oklahoma City v. Griffin, 403 P.2d 463 (Okla. 1965); Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579,  71 A.L.R. 604 (1930).

As to the guaranty of equal protection generally, see 16A Am Jur 2d,  Constitutional Law §§ 735-803.

As to vehicle regulations discriminating against interstate commerce, see  § 27.

Footnote 6. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Serv. Com'n,  295 U.S. 285,  55 S. Ct. 709,  79 L. Ed. 1439 (1935) (called into doubt on other grounds by, American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner,  483 U.S. 266,  107 S. Ct. 2829,  97 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987)) and (overruling on other grounds recognized by, American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Goldstein, 312 Md. 583, 541 A.2d 955 (1988)) and (abrogation on other grounds recognized by, American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith,  496 U.S. 167,  110 S. Ct. 2323,  110 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990)); Stanley v. Public Utilities Commission of Maine,  295 U.S. 76,  55 S. Ct. 628,  79 L. Ed. 1311 (1935); Hicklin v. Coney,  290 U.S. 169,  54 S. Ct. 142,  78 L. Ed. 247 (1933); Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,  289 U.S. 92,  53 S. Ct. 577,  77 L. Ed. 1053, Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1933C-259,  85 A.L.R. 1131 (1933); Stephenson v. Binford,  287 U.S. 251,  53 S. Ct. 181,  77 L. Ed. 288, Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1933A-440,  87 A.L.R. 721 (1932); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring,  286 U.S. 352,  52 S. Ct. 595,  76 L. Ed. 1155,  81 A.L.R. 1402 (1932); Ex parte Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, 150 P. 348 (1915); Allen v. Smith, 84 Ohio St. 283, 95 N.E. 829 (1911).

Footnote 7. Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 132 U.S. App. D.C. 200, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Hertz Drivurself Stations v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464,  7 A.L.R.2d 438 (1948).

Footnote 8. Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring,  286 U.S. 352,  52 S. Ct. 595,  76 L. Ed. 1155,  81 A.L.R. 1402 (1932).

Footnote 9. Gutridge v. Com. of Va., 532 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Va. 1982); City of Tulsa v. Martin, 775 P.2d 824 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied,  493 U.S. 897,  110 S. Ct. 251,  107 L. Ed. 2d 200 (1989).

Footnote 10. Gutridge v. Com. of Va., 532 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Va. 1982); State v. Moore, 259 Ga. 139, 376 S.E.2d 877 (1989); Springfield Park Dist. v. Buckley, 140 Ill. App. 3d 524, 94 Ill. Dec. 824, 488 N.E.2d 1071 (4th Dist. 1986); Robotham v. State, 241 Neb. 379, 488 N.W.2d 533 (1992); Toledo v. Wacenske, 95 Ohio App. 3d 282, 642 N.E.2d 407 (6th Dist.Lucas County 1994), dismissed, appeal not allowed, 71 Ohio St. 3d 1404, 641 N.E.2d 202 (1994); City of Tulsa v. Martin, 775 P.2d 824 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied,  493 U.S. 897,  110 S. Ct. 251,  107 L. Ed. 2d 200 (1989).

Footnote 11. Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring,  286 U.S. 352,  52 S. Ct. 595,  76 L. Ed. 1155,  81 A.L.R. 1402 (1932); Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, 74 N.E. 1035 (1905); Koplovitz v. Jensen, 197 Ind. 475, 151 N.E. 390 (1926); State v Mayo, 106 Me 62, 75 A 295; State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517, 102 S.W. 483 (1907); Allen v. Smith, 84 Ohio St. 283, 95 N.E. 829 (1911); Hickey v. Riley, 177 Or. 321, 162 P.2d 371 (1945).

Footnote 12. Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, 74 N.E. 1035 (1905); Commonwealth v. Nolan, 189 Ky. 34, 224 S.W. 506,  11 A.L.R. 202 (1920); State v Mayo, 106 Me 62, 75 A 295; Mahoney v. Maxfield, 102 Minn. 377, 113 N.W. 904 (1907); State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517, 102 S.W. 483 (1907); Schultz v. State, 89 Neb. 34, 130 N.W. 972 (1911); Allen v. Smith, 84 Ohio St. 283, 95 N.E. 829 (1911); City of Tulsa v. Martin, 775 P.2d 824 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied,  493 U.S. 897,  110 S. Ct. 251,  107 L. Ed. 2d 200 (1989) (seat belts in passenger cars only).

Footnote 13. Shanks v. Forsyth County Park Authority, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1231 (M.D.N.C. 1994) (prohibiting motorcycles in public park); Warner v. Leslie-Elliott Constructors, Inc., 194 Conn. 129, 479 A.2d 231 (1984); Leonard v. Parrish, 420 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), related reference, 435 N.W.2d 842 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) and (disagreed with on other grounds by, Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prod. Co., 64 Ohio St. 3d 601, 597 N.E.2d 474 (1992)) (helmet law); American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. City of St. Louis, 622 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1981) (restriction on motorcycles in public parks); Robotham v. State, 241 Neb. 379, 488 N.W.2d 533 (1992) (helmet law); Toledo v. Wacenske, 95 Ohio App. 3d 282, 642 N.E.2d 407 (6th Dist.Lucas County 1994), dismissed, appeal not allowed, 71 Ohio St. 3d 1404, 641 N.E.2d 202 (1994) (requiring use of headlights during day light hours); Com. v. Kautz, 341 Pa. Super. 374, 491 A.2d 864 (1985), appeal denied, (Oct. 29, 1985) (helmet law); Benning v. State, 161 Vt. 472, 641 A.2d 757 (1994) (helmet law).

Footnote 14. Springfield Park Dist. v. Buckley, 140 Ill. App. 3d 524, 94 Ill. Dec. 824, 488 N.E.2d 1071 (4th Dist. 1986); American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Park Com'n of City of Brockton, 412 Mass. 753, 592 N.E.2d 1314 (1992); Rogers v. Town of Provincetown, 384 Mass. 179, 424 N.E.2d 239 (1981).

Footnote 15. People v. Staton, 248 Ill. App. 3d 799, 189 Ill. Dec. 76, 619 N.E.2d 777 (2d Dist. 1993), appeal denied, 153 Ill. 2d 568, 191 Ill. Dec. 627, 624 N.E.2d 815 (1993).

Footnote 16. Clem v. City of La Grange, 169 Ga. 51, 149 S.E. 638,  65 A.L.R. 1361 (1929); City of Memphis v. State, 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S.W. 631 (1915).

Footnote 17. City of Memphis v. State, 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S.W. 631 (1915).

Footnote 18. Santos v. City of Houston, Tex., 852 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (declined to follow on other grounds by, Forest Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Mercy Ambulance of Richmond, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Va. 1997)).

Footnote 19. Stephenson v. Binford,  287 U.S. 251,  53 S. Ct. 181,  77 L. Ed. 288, Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1933A-440,  87 A.L.R. 721 (1932); H. P. Welch Co. v. State, 89 N.H. 428, 199 A. 886,  120 A.L.R. 282 (1938), judgment aff'd,  306 U.S. 79,  59 S. Ct. 438,  83 L. Ed. 500 (1939); Collins-Dietz-Morris Co. v. State Corp. Com'n, 154 Okla. 121, 7 P.2d 123,  80 A.L.R. 561 (1931).

The use upon the public highways of motor vehicles engaged in transportation for hire may be prohibited, restricted, or conditioned by the controlling public authority. 20  This rule applies to private contract carriers 21  as well as to common carriers. 22   

With respect to the applicability of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable classifications, 23   it has been expressly recognized that buses form a separate and distinct class of conveyance, and that therefore regulations pertaining to such vehicles are not discriminatory because streetcars, taxicabs, and the like, are excluded from their operation. 24    So too, as a general rule, "jitneys" may be subjected to different regulations than those applicable to privately owned automobiles, 25  although an ordinance prohibiting jitneys has been held to be unconstitutional classification on the ground that it bore no substantial relationship to traffic safety. 26   A distinction may also be made between private carriers who transport their own property for compensation and those who transport their own property without compensation. 27          

Matters relating to the regulation of the business of transportation for hire, such as requirements for special licenses or permits or certificates of convenience and necessity, the regulation of rates and charges, and the establishment of schedules and routes, are discussed in other articles. 28   

Footnote 20. Stephenson v. Binford,  287 U.S. 251,  53 S. Ct. 181,  77 L. Ed. 288, Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1933A-440,  87 A.L.R. 721 (1932); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring,  286 U.S. 352,  52 S. Ct. 595,  76 L. Ed. 1155,  81 A.L.R. 1402 (1932); Mears Transp. Group v. State, 34 F.3d 1013 (11th Cir. 1994) (overruling on other grounds recognized by, Preferred Physicians Mut. Risk Retention Group v. Cuomo, 865 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)) and cert. denied,  514 U.S. 1109,  115 S. Ct. 1960,  131 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1995); Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Knight, 172 Ga. 371, 157 S.E. 309,  73 A.L.R. 1289 (1931); Village of Schaumburg v. Franberg, 99 Ill. App. 3d 1, 54 Ill. Dec. 336, 424 N.E.2d 1239 (1st Dist. 1981); Dresser v. City of Wichita, 96 Kan. 820, 153 P. 1194 (1915); Slusher v. Safety Coach Transit Co., 229 Ky. 731, 17 S.W.2d 1012,  66 A.L.R. 1378 (1929); City of New Orleans v. Calamari, 150 La. 737, 91 So. 172,  22 A.L.R. 106 (1922); Rutledge Co-op. Ass'n v. Baughman, 153 Md. 297, 138 A. 29,  56 A.L.R. 1042 (1927); Haselton v. Interstate Stage Lines, 82 N.H. 327, 133 A. 451,  47 A.L.R. 218 (1926); People v. Jabaar,  163 Misc. 2d 1045, 623 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Village Ct. 1994); Whaley v. Lenoir County, 5 N.C. App. 319, 168 S.E.2d 411 (1969); Collins-Dietz-Morris Co. v. State Corp. Com'n, 154 Okla. 121, 7 P.2d 123,  80 A.L.R. 561 (1931); State v. Bounds, 604 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. 1980); Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co. v. Grassmeyer, 102 Wash. 482, 173 P. 504 (1918); Ex parte Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781 (1915).

As to regulations affecting interstate commerce, see  § 27.

Footnote 21. Hicklin v. Coney,  290 U.S. 169,  54 S. Ct. 142,  78 L. Ed. 247 (1933); Stephenson v. Binford,  287 U.S. 251,  53 S. Ct. 181,  77 L. Ed. 288, Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1933A-440,  87 A.L.R. 721 (1932).

Footnote 22. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Knight, 172 Ga. 371, 157 S.E. 309,  73 A.L.R. 1289 (1931); Village of Schaumburg v. Franberg, 99 Ill. App. 3d 1, 54 Ill. Dec. 336, 424 N.E.2d 1239 (1st Dist. 1981); Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, 168 P. 516 (1917); Ex parte Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781 (1915).

Footnote 23.  § 25.

Footnote 24. Clem v. City of La Grange, 169 Ga. 51, 149 S.E. 638,  65 A.L.R. 1361 (1929); City of Memphis v. State, 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S.W. 631 (1915).

Footnote 25. City of Memphis v. State, 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S.W. 631 (1915).

Footnote 26. Santos v. City of Houston, Tex., 852 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (declined to follow on other grounds by, Forest Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Mercy Ambulance of Richmond, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Va. 1997)).

Footnote 27. Stephenson v. Binford,  287 U.S. 251,  53 S. Ct. 181,  77 L. Ed. 288, Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1933A-440,  87 A.L.R. 721 (1932); H. P. Welch Co. v. State, 89 N.H. 428, 199 A. 886,  120 A.L.R. 282 (1938), judgment aff'd,  306 U.S. 79,  59 S. Ct. 438,  83 L. Ed. 500 (1939); Collins-Dietz-Morris Co. v. State Corp. Com'n, 154 Okla. 121, 7 P.2d 123,  80 A.L.R. 561 (1931).

Footnote 28. See 13, 14 Am Jur 2d,  Carriers; 64 Am Jur 2d,  Public Utilities.

In the absence of an act of Congress covering the subject, a state may impose upon vehicles using its highways in interstate commerce nondiscriminatory regulations for the purpose of insuring the public safety and convenience, and for the protection and conservation of the use of such highways. 29   Even though a local regulation materially interferes with interstate commerce, great leeway is allowed local authorities where traffic control and the use of highways are involved and where there is no conflicting federal regulation. 30  For example, state legislatures have great leeway in providing safety regulations for all vehicles, interstate as well as local, 31  such measures carrying a strong presumption of validity when challenged in the courts. 32     

If a statute is neutral on its face, has only indirect or incidental effects on interstate commerce, and regulates evenhandedly, the statute will be upheld unless the burden on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. 33   Thus, a state highway safety measure affecting interstate commerce will, absent federal entry into the field, be upheld, unless from the whole record it can be concluded that the total effect of the state law furthers the purpose of safety so marginally and interferes with commerce so substantially that it must be invalid. 34    

Taken into consideration with other factors, the cost involved in complying with state regulations applicable to interstate commerce may be relevant to the issue of a burden on commerce. 35  However, even though a state which adopts a safety measure requiring a motor carrier design which is out of line with the requirements of almost all other states may sometimes place a great burden of delay and inconvenience on those interstate motor carriers entering or crossing its territory, such a new safety measure may be so compelling that the innovating state need not be the one to give way. 36  
A statute which clearly discriminates against interstate commerce is unconstitutional unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protection. 37  Thus, state regulations of motor vehicles engaged in transportation for hire which unreasonably interfere with or discriminate against interstate commerce are invalid. 38    When a state goes beyond the regulation of the manner of use of highways, and purports to determine the persons by whom an interstate highway may be used, its regulation may be attacked successfully on the ground of an imposition of a burden on interstate commerce. 39    However, the reasonableness of regulations as applied to motor vehicles must be judged with a proper regard to the safety and convenience of the public, in view of local conditions, on the one hand, and the necessities of those engaged in interstate transportation, on the other. 40   Such regulations, although they may entail some degree of inconvenience or interference, will not be regarded as a direct and unlawful burden upon interstate commerce. 41  On the other hand, in exercising its power to regulate the use of highways by motor vehicles moving in interstate commerce, one state cannot establish standards which would derogate from the equal power of other states to make regulations of their own. 42    

Municipalities retain considerable authority to regulate how motor vehicles engaged in interstate commerce shall be operated over their streets, 43   and may require that such vehicles obey traffic and other general safety regulations. 44    

Footnote 29. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware,  450 U.S. 662,  101 S. Ct. 1309,  67 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1981) (called into doubt on other grounds by, American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Larson, 515 F. Supp. 1327 (M.D. Pa. 1981)) and (declined to follow on other grounds by, American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Larson, 683 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1982)); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,  359 U.S. 520,  79 S. Ct. 962,  3 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (1959); People of State of Cal. v. Thompson,  313 U.S. 109,  61 S. Ct. 930,  85 L. Ed. 1219 (1941); South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros.,  303 U.S. 177,  58 S. Ct. 510,  82 L. Ed. 734 (1938); Sproles v. Binford,  286 U.S. 374,  52 S. Ct. 581,  76 L. Ed. 1167 (1932); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring,  286 U.S. 352,  52 S. Ct. 595,  76 L. Ed. 1155,  81 A.L.R. 1402 (1932); Sprout v. City of South Bend, Ind.,  277 U.S. 163,  48 S. Ct. 502,  72 L. Ed. 833,  62 A.L.R. 45 (1928), mandate conformed to, 200 Ind. 162, 162 N.E. 54 (1928); Gutridge v. Com. of Va., 532 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Va. 1982); People v. Strawn, 210 Ill. App. 3d 783, 155 Ill. Dec. 269, 569 N.E.2d 269 (4th Dist. 1991), appeal denied, 141 Ill. 2d 557, 162 Ill. Dec. 505, 580 N.E.2d 131 (1991); R.B. Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 242 Kan. 241, 747 P.2d 152 (1987); Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S.W.2d 691,  87 A.L.R. 534 (1932); State v. Dillon, 670 So. 2d 278 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996); State v. Genesis Leasing Corp., 197 N.J. Super. 284, 484 A.2d 1263 (App. Div. 1984); Avery v. Interstate Grocery Co., 118 Okla. 268, 248 P. 340,  52 A.L.R. 528(1926); Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Railroad Commission of Tex., 128 Tex. 560, 99 S.W.2d 263,  109 A.L.R. 1235 (1936); State v. Wetzel,  208 Wis. 603, 243 N.W. 768,  86 A.L.R. 274 (1932).

Annotation: State regulation of carriers by motor vehicle as affected by interstate commerce clause or federal legislation issued thereunder–Supreme Court cases,  2 L. Ed. 2d 2090.

Footnote 30. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,  359 U.S. 520,  79 S. Ct. 962,  3 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (1959); Railway Exp. Agency v. People of State of N.Y.,  336 U.S. 106,  69 S. Ct. 463,  93 L. Ed. 533 (1949); Gutridge v. Com. of Va., 532 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Va. 1982); State v. Dillon, 670 So. 2d 278 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996).

Safety regulations are accorded particular deference in commerce clause analysis.  Electrolert Corp. v. Barry, 237 U.S. App. D.C. 328, 737 F.2d 110 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding prohibition of radar detectors does not violate commerce clause); Bryant Radio Supply, Inc. v. Slane, 507 F. Supp. 1325 (W.D. Va. 1981), judgment aff'd, 669 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1982) (same).

Footnote 31. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware,  450 U.S. 662,  101 S. Ct. 1309,  67 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1981) (called into doubt on other grounds by, American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Larson, 515 F. Supp. 1327 (M.D. Pa. 1981)) and (declined to follow on other grounds by, American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Larson, 683 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1982)); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,  359 U.S. 520,  79 S. Ct. 962,  3 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (1959).

Footnote 32. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware,  450 U.S. 662,  101 S. Ct. 1309,  67 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1981) (called into doubt on other grounds by, American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Larson, 515 F. Supp. 1327 (M.D. Pa. 1981)) and (declined to follow on other grounds by, American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Larson, 683 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1982)); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,  359 U.S. 520,  79 S. Ct. 962,  3 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (1959); South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros.,  303 U.S. 177,  58 S. Ct. 510,  82 L. Ed. 734 (1938); Gutridge v. Com. of Va., 532 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Va. 1982).

Footnote 33. Government Suppliers Consolidating Services, Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 35 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1622, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. 20042 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,  506 U.S. 1053,  113 S. Ct. 977,  122 L. Ed. 2d 131, 36 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1048 (1993).

Footnote 34. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,  359 U.S. 520,  79 S. Ct. 962,  3 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (1959); People v. Strawn, 210 Ill. App. 3d 783, 155 Ill. Dec. 269, 569 N.E.2d 269 (4th Dist. 1991), appeal denied, 141 Ill. 2d 557, 162 Ill. Dec. 505, 580 N.E.2d 131 (1991); State v. Dillon, 670 So. 2d 278 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996).

Footnote 35. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,  359 U.S. 520,  79 S. Ct. 962,  3 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (1959).

Footnote 36. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,  359 U.S. 520,  79 S. Ct. 962,  3 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (1959).

Footnote 37. Government Suppliers Consolidating Services, Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 35 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1622, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. 20042 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,  506 U.S. 1053,  113 S. Ct. 977,  122 L. Ed. 2d 131, 36 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1048 (1993).

Footnote 38. Buck v. Kuykendall,  267 U.S. 307,  45 S. Ct. 324,  69 L. Ed. 623, Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1925C-483,  38 A.L.R. 286 (1925).

Footnote 39. George W. Bush & Sons Co. v. Maloy,  267 U.S. 317,  45 S. Ct. 326,  69 L. Ed. 627, Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1925C-488 (1925); Buck v. Kuykendall,  267 U.S. 307,  45 S. Ct. 324,  69 L. Ed. 623, Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1925C-483,  38 A.L.R. 286 (1925).

Footnote 40. Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,  289 U.S. 92,  53 S. Ct. 577,  77 L. Ed. 1053, Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1933C-259,  85 A.L.R. 1131 (1933).

Footnote 41. South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros.,  303 U.S. 177,  58 S. Ct. 510,  82 L. Ed. 734 (1938); Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,  289 U.S. 92,  53 S. Ct. 577,  77 L. Ed. 1053, Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1933C-259,  85 A.L.R. 1131 (1933); Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke,  266 U.S. 570,  45 S. Ct. 191,  69 L. Ed. 445,  36 A.L.R. 1105 (1925).

Footnote 42. Sproles v. Binford,  286 U.S. 374,  52 S. Ct. 581,  76 L. Ed. 1167 (1932).

Footnote 43. City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.,  357 U.S. 77,  78 S. Ct. 1063,  2 L. Ed. 2d 1174, 24 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 501 (1958); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Cal.,  346 U.S. 346,  74 S. Ct. 92,  98 L. Ed. 51, 1 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 414 (1953).

Annotation: State regulation of carriers by motor vehicle as affected by interstate commerce clause or federal legislation issued thereunder–Supreme Court cases,  2 L. Ed. 2d 2090.

Footnote 44. City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.,  357 U.S. 77,  78 S. Ct. 1063,  2 L. Ed. 2d 1174, 24 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 501 (1958).

Annotation: State regulation of carriers by motor vehicle as affected by interstate commerce clause or federal legislation issued thereunder–Supreme Court cases,  2 L. Ed. 2d 2090.

II.  TITLE AND OWNERSHIP; TRANSFERS AND ENCUMBRANCES [28-54]

A.  Title [28-32]

Title to, or ownership of, a motor vehicle may be evidenced by possession of a bill of sale, 45   certificate of title, 46   or certificate of registration, 47   relating to such vehicle, although such documents do not ordinarily establish conclusively the ownership of such a vehicle, but are merely prima facie evidence thereof. 48   Moreover, the mere fact that one has possession of a motor vehicle is not conclusive evidence of ownership and of the right of disposal, 49  although a rebuttable presumption of ownership is created thereby. 50    The question of ownership is one of fact to be decided by the factfinder. 51  

Footnote 45.  § 32.

Footnote 46.  § 29.

Footnote 47.  § 31.

Footnote 48. Woodard v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 418 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1969); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Moen, 940 F.2d 1069 (7th Cir. 1991); Bowen v. Gardner, 275 N.C. 363, 168 S.E.2d 47 (1969).

Ownership proven by possession, signed bill of sale and endorsed certificate of title.  Theriac v. McKeever, 405 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1981).

Footnote 49. Matter of Stewart, 9 B.R. 32 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980); Forrest v. Benson, 150 Ark. 89, 233 S.W. 916 (1921).

Footnote 50. Penticost v. Massey, 201 Ala. 261, 77 So. 675 (1917); Forrest v. Benson, 150 Ark. 89, 233 S.W. 916 (1921); De Puy v. Shay, 127 Cal. App. 476, 16 P.2d 158 (4th Dist. 1932); Mogul Transp. Co. v. Larison, 181 Or. 252, 181 P.2d 139 (1947); Forman v. Washington, 3 Tenn. App. 567 (1926).

Possession is evidence of ownership.  In re Trivett, 12 B.R. 373, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 1206 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981).

The true owner is the person who maintains possession and control of the automobile.  Verriest v. INA Underwriters Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 401, 662 A.2d 967 (1995).

Annotation: Presumption and prima facie case as to ownership of vehicle causing highway accident,  27 A.L.R.2d 167, § 12.

Footnote 51. Botsford General Hosp. v. Citizens Ins. Co., 195 Mich. App. 127, 489 N.W.2d 137 (1992), appeal denied, 441 Mich. 912, 496 N.W.2d 293 (1993); Sosnowski v. Kolovas,  127 A.D.2d 756, 512 N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dep't 1987).

In many states the statutes provide a system of registering the title to motor vehicles not unlike the Torrens system of registering title to real property. 52   Such statutes constitute an authorized exercise of the police power on the part of the legislature, and do not violate any of the provisions of the Federal Constitution. 53   The provisions of such statutes vary between jurisdictions, but they have in common an arrangement for the issuance of a certificate of title or similar instrument which, it is intended, shall show who is the owner of the vehicle. 54   Such statutes are to be interpreted in accordance with the general purpose sought to be effectuated by them, 55  which is to afford the public a means of proper determination of ownership and encumbrance of motor vehicles and to protect innocent purchasers 56  and the public against fraud and imposition in transactions involving the titles of motor vehicles, and to discourage larceny and unlawful disposition of such vehicles. 57  

̈ Observation: Such statutes have no extraterritorial effect. 58

The effect of a certificate of title as proof of the title to, or ownership of, a motor vehicle depends upon the terms of the statute involved and the construction thereof in the particular jurisdiction.  In most jurisdictions, in accordance with the applicable statute, the certificate of title is considered to be only prima facie evidence of ownership. 59   It is not the exclusive method of proving ownership, 60  nor does it necessarily provide conclusive evidence of ownership; 61   it merely provides some evidence of ownership. 62   

In many jurisdictions, a certificate of title is presumptive evidence of ownership. 63    In some jurisdictions this presumption may only be rebutted by evidence of fraud, coercion, theft, forgery, or misrepresentation. 64   Other jurisdictions require clear and convincing proof of actual ownership in order to rebut the presumption of ownership created by the certificate of title. 65   Many jurisdictions find that the presumption may be rebutted by competent evidence of actual ownership 66   arising from the particular facts and circumstances of the case. 67   However, it has been held in some jurisdictions that where a person has both possession of the automobile and a certificate of title in his or her name there is irrebuttable evidence of ownership. 68

̈ Observation: In an action to recover for damages to a motor vehicle, a certificate of title may be the only acceptable proof of title to the damaged vehicle under the terms of the statute in a particular jurisdiction. 69    This does not mean however that the parties may not stipulate as to the ownership of the motor vehicle, rendering proof unnecessary. 70

One who purchases a motor vehicle and has the certificate of title issued in the name of another, and who wishes to establish a resulting trust, has the burden of establishing such trust by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. 71   Where the statute provides that evidence is not admissible to dispute the title of one to whom a certificate of title to a motor vehicle has been issued pursuant to statute, except evidence to establish fraud which would cause such certificate to be voidable, a resulting trust with respect to a motor vehicle cannot be created in the absence of proof of fraud. 72

Footnote 52. Merchants Rating & Adjusting Co. v. Skaug, 4 Wash. 2d 46, 102 P.2d 227 (1940).

Footnote 53. State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Taggart, 134 Ohio St. 374, 12 Ohio Op. 517, 17 N.E.2d 758 (1938).

Such a statute is a police regulation of the highest order and should be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose.  Shaffer v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 903 S.W.2d 600 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1995), reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Aug. 3, 1995).

Footnote 54. Hicks v. Thomas, 516 So. 2d 1344, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 105 (Miss. 1987); Martin v. Nager, 192 N.J. Super. 189, 469 A.2d 519, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 781 (Ch. Div. 1983); City Finance Co. v. Perry, 195 Tenn. 81, 257 S.W.2d 1,  36 A.L.R.2d 224 (1953); Drake Ins. Co. v. King, 606 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1980) (declined to extend on other grounds by, Pierce v. First Nat. Bank of Alvin, 899 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1995)).

Person whose name is on the certificate of title is the owner of the motor vehicle.  Kovacich v. Norgaard, 221 Mont. 26, 716 P.2d 633 (1986).

Forms: Affidavit–Loss of certificate of title to vehicle.  1 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property §  1:47.

Application–For certificate of title–In form of affidavit.  3 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §  33:28.

Footnote 55. Theriac v. McKeever, 405 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1981); Taylor v. Burdick, 320 Mich. 25, 30 N.W.2d 418 (1948); Shaffer v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 903 S.W.2d 600 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1995), reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Aug. 3, 1995).

Footnote 56. Champa v. Consolidated Finance Corp., 231 Ind. 580, 110 N.E.2d 289,  36 A.L.R.2d 185 (1953); Theriac v. McKeever, 405 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1981); Kovacich v. Norgaard, 221 Mont. 26, 716 P.2d 633 (1986); Dartmouth Motor Sales, Inc. v. Wilcox, 128 N.H. 526, 517 A.2d 804, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 895 (1986).

Footnote 57. Congress Finance Corp. v. Funderburk, 416 So. 2d 1059 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982); Taylor v. Burdick, 320 Mich. 25, 30 N.W.2d 418 (1948); Shaffer v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 903 S.W.2d 600 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1995), reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Aug. 3, 1995); Dartmouth Motor Sales, Inc. v. Wilcox, 128 N.H. 526, 517 A.2d 804, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 895 (1986); Martin v. Nager, 192 N.J. Super. 189, 469 A.2d 519, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 781 (Ch. Div. 1983); Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 37 Ohio St. 3d 150, 524 N.E.2d 507 (1988) (holding limited on other grounds by, Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Smith, 80 Ohio App. 3d 426, 609 N.E.2d 585, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1251 (4th Dist.Washington County 1992)); Union Bank of Tucson, Arizona v. Griffin, 771 P.2d 219 (Okla. 1989); First Tennessee Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Jones, 732 S.W.2d 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); Jarrin v. Sam White Oldsmobile Co., 929 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1996), reh'g denied, (May 31, 1996) and writ denied, (Feb. 13, 1997).

The purpose is to prevent trafficking in stolen vehicles, aid in apprehension of criminals, and protect the innocent from the machinations of the wicked.  In re Miranda, 150 B.R. 726, 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1620 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993), related reference, 172 B.R. 55 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994).

Annotation: Liability of state, in issuing automobile certificate of title, for failure to discover title defect,  28 A.L.R.4th 184.

Footnote 58. Furches v. Ring, 171 Ga. App. 19, 318 S.E.2d 762 (1984); State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Taggart, 134 Ohio St. 374, 12 Ohio Op. 517, 17 N.E.2d 758 (1938).

Footnote 59. In re Beaudoin, 160 B.R. 25 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1993); Matter of Robison, 665 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1981); Colorado Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. CAT Continental, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 49 (D. Colo. 1986); In re Perkins, 169 B.R. 455 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1994); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 668 So. 2d 539 (Ala. 1995), reh'g denied, (Aug. 18, 1995); In re One 1983 Toyota Silver Four-Door Sedan, VIN No. JT2MX63E4D0004378, 168 Ariz. 399, 814 P.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1991) (called into doubt on other grounds by, State v. Leyva, 184 Ariz. 439, 909 P.2d 506 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1995)); G.E. Credit Corp. v. Catalina Homes, Inc., 178 Ga. App. 319, 342 S.E.2d 734, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 971 (1986), cert. denied, (Apr. 8, 1986); Pekin Ins. Co. v. U.S. Credit Funding, Ltd., 212 Ill. App. 3d 673, 156 Ill. Dec. 789, 571 N.E.2d 769 (1st Dist. 1991), appeal denied, 141 Ill. 2d 545, 162 Ill. Dec. 493, 580 N.E.2d 119 (1991); Champa v. Consolidated Finance Corp., 231 Ind. 580, 110 N.E.2d 289,  36 A.L.R.2d 185 (1953); Inmi-Etti v. Aluisi, 63 Md. App. 293, 492 A.2d 917, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 1612 (1985); Estate of Wilson, 740 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1987); Hanson v. General Motors Corp., 241 Neb. 81, 486 N.W.2d 223 (1992); Lee v. General Acc. Ins. Co., 106 N.M. 22, 738 P.2d 516 (1987); Sosnowski v. Kolovas,  127 A.D.2d 756, 512N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dep't 1987); Mogul Transp. Co. v. Larison, 181 Or. 252, 181 P.2d 139 (1947); Unisun Ins. Co. v. First Southern Ins. Co., 319 S.C. 419, 462 S.E.2d 260 (1995), reh'g denied, (Oct. 6, 1995); Heinrich v. Titus-Will Sales, Inc., 73 Wash. App. 147, 868 P.2d 169, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1143 (Div. 2 1994).

Certificate of title is primary indicia of ownership.  Van Hooser v. Banks, 816 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1991).

Footnote 60. In re Perkins, 169 B.R. 455 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1994); Bank South, N.A. v. Zweig, 217 Ga. App. 77, 456 S.E.2d 257 (1995), reconsideration denied, (Mar. 29, 1995); Pekin Ins. Co. v. Charlie Rowe Chevrolet, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 1367, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 125 (Ind. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1990); Heinrich v. Titus-Will Sales, Inc., 73 Wash. App. 147, 868 P.2d 169, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1143 (Div. 2 1994).

A certificate of title is not the highest and best evidence of ownership of a vehicle.  Bradshaw v. State, 162 Ga. App. 750, 293 S.E.2d 360 (1982).

One can own an automobile even though the certificate of title is in the name of another.  Pekin Ins. Co. v. U.S. Credit Funding, Ltd., 212 Ill. App. 3d 673, 156 Ill. Dec. 789, 571 N.E.2d 769 (1st Dist. 1991), appeal denied, 141 Ill. 2d 545, 162 Ill. Dec. 493, 580 N.E.2d 119 (1991); ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Unlimited Automotive, Inc., 166 B.R. 637, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 357 (N.D. Ill. 1994).

Footnote 61. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Duncan, 972 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Potter's Landscape Nursery, Inc., 44 B.R. 198 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In re Haigler, 119 B.R. 531 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1989), reconsideration denied, (Jan. 22, 1990); In re Trivett, 12 B.R. 373, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 1206 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); Matter of Robison, 665 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1981); Colorado Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. CAT Continental, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 49 (D. Colo. 1986); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 668 So. 2d 539 (Ala. 1995), reh'g denied, (Aug. 18, 1995); Matter of One 1985 Mercedes Benz Auto., 644 A.2d 423 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992); Pekin Ins. Co. v. U.S. Credit Funding, Ltd., 212 Ill. App. 3d 673, 156 Ill. Dec. 789, 571 N.E.2d 769 (1st Dist. 1991), appeal denied, 141 Ill. 2d 545, 162 Ill. Dec. 493, 580 N.E.2d 119 (1991); Sterling v. Capital Financial Services Inc., 480 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1985), reh'g denied, (Aug. 28, 1985) and transfer denied, (Jan. 3, 1986); Vannoy Chevrolet Co. v. Baum, 260 Iowa 1011, 151 N.W.2d 515 (1967); VanHooser v. Banks, 816 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1991); Hanson v. General Motors Corp., 241 Neb. 81, 486 N.W.2d 223 (1992); Sosnowski v. Kolovas,  127 A.D.2d 756, 512 N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dep't 1987); Petition of Hennessy, 343 Pa. Super. 293, 494 A.2d 853, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 92 (1985), appeal denied, (Jan. 21, 1986); Keller v. Judd, 671 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1984); Heinrich v. Titus-Will Sales, Inc., 73 Wash. App. 147, 868 P.2d 169, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1143 (Div. 2 1994); Keyes v. Keyes, 182 W. Va. 802, 392 S.E.2d 693 (1990).

A certificate of title is not absolute proof of ownership.  First Tennessee Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Jones, 732 S.W.2d 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

A certificate of title is a document of convenience rather than a document of ownership.  In re Foster, 611 P.2d 232, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 811 (Okla. 1980).

The intention of the parties, not a certificate of title, determines ownership.  Smith v. Smith, 650 S.W.2d 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

Footnote 62. In re Ambrose, 148 B.R. 244 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992); In re Haigler, 119 B.R. 531 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1989), reconsideration denied, (Jan. 22, 1990); Bank South, N.A. v. Zweig, 217 Ga. App. 77, 456 S.E.2d 257 (1995), reconsideration denied, (Mar. 29, 1995); Sterling v. Capital Financial Services Inc., 480 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1985), reh'g denied, (Aug. 28, 1985) and transfer denied, (Jan. 3, 1986); Keyes v. Keyes, 182 W. Va. 802, 392 S.E.2d 693 (1990); Bacheller v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co.,  93 Wis. 2d 564, 290 N.W.2d 872, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 837 (1980).

Footnote 63. Matter of One 1985 Mercedes Benz Auto., 644 A.2d 423 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992); McCollough v. State, 612 So. 2d 697 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1993); Pritchett v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 158 Tex. 116, 309 S.W.2d 46 (1958); Keller v. Judd, 671 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1984); Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 417 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Compliance with the certificate of title requirements establishes a conclusive presumption of sale; however noncompliance does not preclude the titleholder from presenting extrinsic evidence to establish that although title was unchanged, a sale had in fact occurred.  Arneson v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 344 N.W.2d 617 (Minn. 1984); Bacheller v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co.,  93 Wis. 2d 564, 290 N.W.2d 872, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 837 (1980).

Footnote 64. In re Akron-Cleveland Auto Rental, Inc., 921 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1990); Nelson v. Cool, 230 Neb. 859, 434 N.W.2d 32 (1989).

Certificate of title is proof of ownership with certain enumerated exceptions.  Hicks v. Thomas, 516 So. 2d 1344, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 105 (Miss. 1987).

Footnote 65. McCollough v. State, 612 So. 2d 697 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1993).

Footnote 66. Pekin Ins. Co. v. U.S. Credit Funding, Ltd., 212 Ill. App. 3d 673, 156 Ill. Dec. 789, 571 N.E.2d 769 (1st Dist. 1991), appeal denied, 141 Ill. 2d 545, 162 Ill. Dec. 493, 580 N.E.2d 119 (1991); Lee v. General Acc. Ins. Co., 106 N.M. 22, 738 P.2d 516 (1987); Sosnowski v. Kolovas,  127 A.D.2d 756, 512 N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dep't 1987); Unisun Ins. Co. v. First Southern Ins. Co., 319 S.C. 419, 462 S.E.2d 260 (1995), reh'g denied, (Oct. 6, 1995); Villa v. Alvarado State Bank, 611 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. Waco 1981); Keyes v. Keyes, 182 W. Va. 802, 392 S.E.2d 693 (1990).

Footnote 67. Colorado Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. CAT Continental, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 49 (D. Colo. 1986); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 668 So. 2d 539 (Ala. 1995), reh'g denied, (Aug. 18, 1995); In re One 1983 Toyota Silver Four-Door Sedan, VIN No. JT2MX63E4D0004378, 168 Ariz. 399, 814 P.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1991) (called into doubt on other grounds by, State v. Leyva, 184 Ariz. 439, 909 P.2d 506 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1995)); Landshire Food Service, Inc. v. Coghill, 709 S.W.2d 509, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 729 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1986); Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 417 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Footnote 68. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co. v. Swenson, 404 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).

Footnote 69. Mielke v. Leeberson, 150 Ohio St. 528, 38 Ohio Op. 352, 83 N.E.2d 209,  7 A.L.R.2d 1342 (1948).

Footnote 70. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dicenzo, 1 Ohio App. 3d 68, 1, 439 N.E.2d 456 (10th Dist. Franklin County 1981).

Footnote 71. Majors v. Majors, 349 Pa. 334, 37 A.2d 528 (1944).

Footnote 72. In re Case's Estate, 161 Ohio St. 288, 53 Ohio Op. 172, 118 N.E.2d 836 (1954).

A number of jurisdictions have recognized that, since statutes relating to the registration of motor vehicles are police or revenue measures, 74   neither compliance nor noncompliance with their terms, although persuasive, is conclusive of the question of title. 75  It is sometimes stated, in this regard, that the registration of a motor vehicle creates a presumption or prima facie showing of ownership of a motor vehicle in the party in whose name the vehicle is registered, 76  and that the presence of one's license plates upon a motor vehicle creates a presumption or prima facie showing that he or she is the owner of the vehicle. 77   And although there is some authority for the contrary view, 78  the presumptions arising from facts related to registration or licensing of a motor vehicle are generally not deemed conclusive but are considered to be rebuttable by the introduction of evidence to the contrary, 79  which evidence must be undisputed, clear, and convincing. 80   When there is competent and sufficient rebuttal evidence, ownership becomes a question of fact for the jury. 81   

Footnote 74.  §§ 55 et seq.

Footnote 75. In re Males, 999 F.2d 607, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 108 (2d Cir. 1993); Zechlin v. Bridges Motor Sales, 190 Mich. App. 339, 475 N.W.2d 60 (1991), appeal denied, 439 Mich. 948, 482 N.W.2d 738 (1992); Schultz v. Murphy, 596 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1980); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Lapp, 215 Mont. 196, 695 P.2d 1310, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 887 (1985); Punis v. Perales,  112 A.D.2d 236, 491 N.Y.S.2d 451 (2d Dep't 1985).

Department of Motor Vehicle records are not conclusive evidence of ownership.  California State Auto. Ass'n v. Foster, 14 Cal. App. 4th 147, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635 (3d Dist. 1993).

Footnote 76. Pfingsten v. Westenhaver, 39 Cal. 2d 12, 244 P.2d 395 (1952); Finkbiner v. Mullins, 532 A.2d 609 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Lapp, 215 Mont. 196, 695 P.2d 1310, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 887 (1985); Elfeld v. Burkham Auto Renting Co., 299 N.Y. 336, 87 N.E.2d 285,  13 A.L.R.2d 370 (1949); Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 417 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Heinrich v. Titus-Will Sales, Inc., 73 Wash. App. 147, 868 P.2d 169, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1143 (Div. 2 1994).

Annotation: Presumption and prima facie case as to ownership of vehicle causing highway accident,  27 A.L.R.2d 167, § 3.

Comment Note–Who is "owner" within statute making owner responsible for injury or death inflicted by operator of automobile,  74 A.L.R.3d 739, § 7.

Footnote 77. Fulater v. Palmer's Granite Garage, Inc.,  90 A.D.2d 685, 456 N.Y.S.2d 289 (4th Dep't 1982); Henry v. Condit, 152 Or. 348, 53 P.2d 722,  103 A.L.R. 131 (1936).

Annotation: Presumption and prima facie case as to ownership of vehicle causing highway accident,  27 A.L.R.2d 167, § 3.

Comment Note–Who is "owner" within statute making owner responsible for injury or death inflicted by operator of automobile,  74 A.L.R.3d 739, § 11[a].

Footnote 78. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 419 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, (May 16, 1988) (holding that registration of a motor vehicle in a buyer's name creates an irrebuttable presumption that ownership has passed from the seller to the buyer).

Footnote 79. Henry v. General Forming, Limited, 33 Cal. 2d 223, 200 P.2d 785 (1948); Hartman v. Norman, 253 Iowa 694, 112 N.W.2d 374 (1961); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 220 Md. 497, 154 A.2d 826 (1959); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Lapp, 215 Mont. 196, 695 P.2d 1310, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 887 (1985); Doughty v. Johnson,  155 A.D.2d 513, 547 N.Y.S.2d 373 (2d Dep't 1989); Henry v. Condit, 152 Or. 348, 53 P.2d 722,  103 A.L.R. 131 (1936); Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, 188 A. 350,  108 A.L.R. 160 (1936) (overruled in part on other grounds by, De Waele v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 358 Pa. 574, 58 A.2d 34 (1948)) and (overruling on other grounds recognized by, Sawczuk-Serge v. Township of Cheltenham, 670 A.2d 210 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996)); Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 417 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Heinrich v. Titus-Will Sales, Inc., 73 Wash. App. 147, 868 P.2d 169, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1143 (Div. 2 1994).

Annotation: Presumption and prima facie case as to ownership of vehicle causing highway accident,  27 A.L.R.2d 167, § 4.

Footnote 80. American Emp. Ins. Co. v. Zablosky, 292 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,  368 U.S. 946,  82 S. Ct. 387,  7 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1961) (applying Texas law); Ford v. Hankins, 209 Ala. 202, 96 So. 349 (1923); Craddock v. Bickelhaupt, 227 Iowa 202, 288 N.W. 109,  135 A.L.R. 474 (1939); Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N.Y. 249, 108 N.E. 406 (1915); Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Muegge, 135 Tex. 520, 143 S.W.2d 763 (Comm'n App. 1940).

Annotation: Presumption and prima facie case as to ownership of vehicle causing highway accident,  27 A.L.R.2d 167, § 5.

Footnote 81. Doughty v. Johnson,  155 A.D.2d 513, 547 N.Y.S.2d 373 (2d Dep't 1989); Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, 188 A. 350,  108 A.L.R. 160 (1936) (overruled in part on other grounds by, De Waele v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 358 Pa. 574, 58 A.2d 34 (1948)) and (overruling on other grounds recognized by, Sawczuk-Serge v. Township of Cheltenham, 670 A.2d 210 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996)).

Evidence including actual possession of the certificate of title (though not in plaintiff's name), license plates issued in plaintiff's name, a receipt indicating money paid by the plaintiff for the vehicle, and insurance applications made by the plaintiff was sufficient to submit the question of ownership to the jury.  Botsford General Hosp. v. Citizens Ins. Co., 195 Mich. App. 127, 489 N.W.2d 137 (1992), appeal denied, 441 Mich. 912, 496 N.W.2d 293 (1993).

In some jurisdictions statutes have been enacted which require the execution of bills of sale in connection with the sale or transfer of motor vehicles. 82   Since such statutes are police measures and regulatory in character, 83  neither compliance nor noncompliance with their terms, although persuasive, 84  is regarded as conclusive of the question of title. 85   

Where there is no statutory requirement that a bill of sale be executed in connection with the transfer of title to a motor vehicle, the absence of a bill of sale does not constitute evidence of nonownership. 86

Footnote 82.  § 38.

Footnote 83.  § 38.

Footnote 84. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 668 So. 2d 539 (Ala. 1995), reh'g denied, (Aug. 18, 1995); Worley v. Schaefer, 228 Neb. 484, 423 N.W.2d 748, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 710 (1988).

Footnote 85. Worley v. Schaefer, 228 Neb. 484, 423 N.W.2d 748, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 710 (1988) (holding that proof of possession of vehicle together with a bill of sale is sufficient to prove ownership of the vehicle).

Forms: Bill of sale–Of automobile.  3 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§  33:24,  33:25.

Footnote 86. General Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 152 Tex. 159, 255 S.W.2d 193 (1953).

B.  Sale, Transfer, and Encumbrances [33-54]

1.  In General [33-41]

This discussion is concerned primarily with provisions of law which relate solely to the sale, transfer, or encumbrance of motor vehicles as distinguished from those provisions of law which relate to the sale, transfer, or encumbrance of personal property generally. 87  Also discussed elsewhere are the liens of garagemen and others for repairs 88   and accessions to motor vehicles. 89  

The sale of motor vehicles is a lawful business which any person has a right to pursue, subject only to reasonable regulation. 90    The regulation of the business of selling motor vehicles, under the state police power, for the purpose of preventing fraud and promoting the general welfare of the public, is a proper subject for legislative action. 91  In adopting such regulations, the legislature may properly differentiate between dealers in new vehicles and dealers in used vehicles. 92   Pursuant to such power, the legislature may adopt regulations imposing license fees and taxes upon persons in the business of selling motor vehicles, 93   and may regulate the sales prices of motor vehicles. 94    

Inasmuch as a contract of purchase and sale, or the encumbrance, of a motor vehicle is not ordinarily different from a contract relating to any other kind of personal property, any statute which limits or prescribes a different form of contract, or a different procedure, is in derogation of common right and of the freedom of contract, and for that reason the statute is subject to the rule of strict construction. 95  

Footnote 87. As to the latter, see 67, 67A Am Jur 2d,  Sales; 72 Am Jur 2d,  Statute of Frauds §§ 129 et seq.

Footnote 88. 38 Am Jur 2d,  Garages, and Filling and Parking Stations §§ 138 et seq.

Footnote 89. See 68A Am Jur 2d,  Secured Transaction § 102.

Footnote 90. Nelsen v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 289 N.W. 388,  126 A.L.R. 729 (1939); In re Hinesley, 82 S.D. 552, 150 N.W.2d 834 (1967) (statute limiting sales of new automobiles to franchised dealers held constitutional).

Footnote 91. Faygal v. Shelter Ins. Co., 689 S.W.2d 724 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1985); Nelsen v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 289 N.W. 388,  126 A.L.R. 729 (1939).

Annotation: Who is "automobile manufacturer" for purposes of the Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act (15 USCA §§  1221 et seq.),  51 A.L.R. Fed. 812.

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes regulating dealings between automobile manufacturers, dealers, and franchisees,  82 A.L.R.4th 624.

Footnote 92. Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission v. Wheeling Frenchman, 235 La. 332, 103 So. 2d 464 (1958); In re Hinesley, 82 S.D. 552, 150 N.W.2d 834 (1967).

As to the regulation of the business of selling second-hand property, generally, see 58 Am Jur 2d,  Occupations, Trades, and Professions §§ 99-112.

Footnote 93.  §§ 182 et seq.

Footnote 94.  §§ 40,  50.

Footnote 95. Clay v. Harris, 228 Ill. App. 3d 475, 170 Ill. Dec. 474, 592 N.E.2d 1154 (4th Dist. 1992), appeal denied, 146 Ill. 2d 624, 176 Ill. Dec. 794, 602 N.E.2d 448 (1992); Commercial Credit Co. v. Schreyer, 120 Ohio St. 568, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 333, 166 N.E. 808,  63 A.L.R. 674 (1929).

In many jurisdictions where provision is made for the issuance of certificates of title to motor vehicles, 96   the sale or transfer of a motor vehicle is consummated by the assignment of the certificate of title to the purchaser or transferee in the method prescribed by statute. 97  In most of these jurisdictions such statutory provisions are viewed as merely police measures, regulatory in character, and are not meant to establish an exclusive method of transfer of title to a motor vehicle. 98     In other jurisdictions, however, the statutory provisions as to the assignment of the certificate of title to a motor vehicle upon the sale or transfer of the vehicle are viewed as absolute and mandatory and are rigidly enforced by the courts, and title does not pass without adherence to such provisions. 99   In such jurisdictions the assignment of the certificate of title in the manner provided by the statute is the exclusive and only method of transferring title to a motor vehicle, whether the transfer is made by the owner by way of sale or gift or is effected by operation of law. 1

Footnote 96. As to certificates of title, generally, see  § 29.

Footnote 97. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. A.L.J.A., Inc., 905 F. Supp. 36, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 167 (D. Mass. 1995); In re Superior Ground Support, Inc., 140 B.R. 878, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 576 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992); Copelco Leasing Corp. v. Eyerman, 855 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D. Mo. 1994); Clay v. Harris, 228 Ill. App. 3d 475, 170 Ill. Dec. 474, 592 N.E.2d 1154 (4th Dist. 1992), appeal denied, 146 Ill. 2d 624, 176 Ill. Dec. 794, 602 N.E.2d 448 (1992); Durbin v. Fletcher, 165 Cal. App. 3d 334, 211 Cal. Rptr. 483 (5th Dist. 1985); Latham Motors, Inc. v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 689, 851 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1992), review denied, (May 24, 1993); Heshion Motors, Inc. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 229 Kan. 412, 625 P.2d 437 (1981); Rogers v. Wheeler, 864 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1993); Com. v. Wellesley Toyota Co., Inc., 18 Mass. App. Ct. 733, 470 N.E.2d 142 (1984); Ladd v. Ford Consumer Finance Co., Inc., 217 Mich. App. 119, 550 N.W.2d 826, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 526 (1996) (mobile homes); Bank North v. Soule, 420 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 1988); Atwood Chevrolet-Olds, Inc. v. Aberdeen Municipal School Dist., 431 So. 2d 926, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 471 (Miss. 1983); Oliver v. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co., 866 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1993), reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Nov. 24, 1993) and transfer denied, (Jan. 25, 1994); People v. Reyes,  130 Misc.2d 1064, 499 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1986); Thompson Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Silk Hope Auto., Inc., 87 N.C. App. 467, 361 S.E.2d 418 (1987), review denied, 321 N.C. 480, 364 S.E.2d 672 (1988); Commercial Finance Corp. v. Burke, 173 Or. 341, 145 P.2d 473,  151 A.L.R. 684 (1944); Morey v. Page, 802 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App. Dallas 1990); Baydo's Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Department of Licensing, 32 Wash. App. 332, 647 P.2d 55 (1982).

Forms: Power of attorney–To register or transfer motor vehicle.  3 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §  33:23.

Footnote 98. Commercial Credit Co. v. McNelly, 36 Del. 88, 171 A. 446 (Super. Ct. 1934); Pekin Ins. Co. v. Charlie Rowe Chevrolet, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 1367, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 125 (Ind. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1990); Moore v. Wilson, 230 Ky. 49, 18 S.W.2d 873 (1929); Touchet v. Guidry, 550 So. 2d 308 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1989); Bond Lumber Co. v. Timmons, 82 Mont. 497, 267 P. 802 (1928); W.S. Maxwell Co. v. Southern Oregon Gas Corp., 158 Or. 168, 74 P.2d 594,  114 A.L.R. 697 (1937), opinion adhered to on reh'g, 158 Or. 168, 75 P.2d 9,  114 A.L.R. 697 (1938).

Footnote 99. Perry v. Goff Motors, Inc., 12 Kan. App. 2d 139, 736 P.2d 949, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1805 (1987); Rogers v. Wheeler, 864 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1993); Ladd v. Ford Consumer Finance Co., Inc., 217 Mich. App. 119, 550 N.W.2d 826, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 526 (1996); Herbert v. Harl, 757 S.W.2d 585, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 740 (Mo. 1988); Dugdale of Nebraska, Inc. v. First State Bank, Gothenburg, Neb., 227 Neb. 729, 420 N.W.2d 273, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 111 (1988) (overruled on other grounds by, Aken v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 245 Neb. 161, 511 N.W.2d 762 (1994)); Thompson Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Silk Hope Auto., Inc., 87 N.C. App. 467, 361 S.E.2d 418 (1987), review denied, 321 N.C. 480, 364 S.E.2d 672 (1988); Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Julian, 247 S.C. 89, 145 S.E.2d 685 (1965).

Footnote 1. Ladd v. Ford Consumer Finance Co., Inc., 217 Mich. App. 119, 550 N.W.2d 826, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 526 (1996); Dugdale of Nebraska, Inc. v. First State Bank, Gothenburg, Neb., 227 Neb. 729, 420 N.W.2d 273, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 111 (1988) (overruled on other grounds by, Aken v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 245 Neb. 161, 511 N.W.2d 762 (1994)); Thompson Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Silk Hope Auto., Inc., 87 N.C. App. 467, 361 S.E.2d 418 (1987), review denied, 321 N.C. 480, 364 S.E.2d 672 (1988) (must be on forms prescribed by state department of motor vehicles).

Statutes in a number of states provide that it is illegal for any person to operate a motor vehicle on state's roads or highways unless the vehicle is registered. 97  These statutes also provide for certain penalties for failure to register, such as police impoundment of vehicles that are improperly registered. 98    Violation of motor vehicle registration statutes may also have other consequences.  For example, where a statute requires a vehicle seller to forward applications for registration of certificates of title to the county treasurer within a certain time after the vehicle is sold, failure to forward those documents constitutes negligence per se. 99

In some jurisdictions, statutes have been enacted that make the payment of property taxes on motor vehicles a condition precedent to the licensing or registration of such vehicles. 1    

Footnote 97. Satterlee v. State, 289 Ark. 450, 711 S.W.2d 827 (1986) (driving a motor vehicle on a public highway without a driver's license illegal); Redden v. State, 739 P.2d 536 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (persons without operator's licenses prohibited from driving upon the state's highways unless expressly exempted); State v. Milligan, 727 P.2d 213 (Utah 1986) (all drivers in state required to hold a valid license); State v. Griffin,  183 Wis. 2d 327, 515 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 520 N.W.2d 88 (Wis. 1994) and cert. denied,  513 U.S. 950,  115 S. Ct. 363,  130 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1994).

Forms: Bond–To obtain registration of motor vehicle brought into state–Warranty of title to vehicle and against encumbrances.  3 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §  33:39.

Affidavit–By owner of automobile–In support of application for certificate of ownership without registration–Vehicle to be operated exclusively on private property.  3 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §  33:40.

Footnote 98. U.S. v. Rios, 88 F.3d 867 (10th Cir. 1996).

Forms: Notice–To registered owner–By state agency–Sale of automobile at public auction–To satisfy lien for registration fee.  3 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §  33:66.

Footnote 99. Tim O'Neill Chevrolet, Inc. v. Forristall, 551 N.W.2d 611 (Iowa 1996).

Footnote 1. State v. Mirabal, 33 N.M. 553, 273 P. 928,  62 A.L.R. 296 (1928).

As to property taxes on motor vehicles, generally, see 71 Am Jur 2d,  State and Local Taxation §§ 20,  196.

3.  Nature and Amount of Tax [71-83]

a.  In General [71-73]

Although motor vehicles may be taxed as property, 86   the charge made in connection with the licensing and registration of motor vehicles is generally deemed to be a license fee or tax for the privilege of using the public highways, rather than a property tax, even where it is based on the vehicle's value, 87  or where the fees go into a general fund, but are earmarked for use to maintain and improve local roads. 88   Because they are not property taxes, such charges are not affected by constitutional provisions governing ad valorem taxes. 89    The charge is designated as an excise, 90  a license, 91  or a privilege 92  tax or fee, or as a service charge. 93   Such a tax or fee has sometimes been said to be in the nature of a toll for using the highways. 94   In some instances, the provisions of particular statutes imposing a charge in connection with the licensing or registration of motor vehicles have been held to impose a property tax, 95   or a combination privilege 96  or license 97   and property tax.

While the intent of the legislature as to whether a fee exacted in connection with the licensing or registration of a motor vehicle constitutes an exercise of the state's police power or the state's taxation power is not absolutely controlling, 98   it is an important factor in determining the nature of the fee. 99    Thus, for example, where the legislation creating a charge assessed for the privilege of operating overweight or over dimensional vehicles on state highways designates the charge as a license fee, it has been considered to be a license fee, which cannot be excessive in relation to the cost of administering the permit program, rather than a tax. 1  

The police power, rather than the taxing power, is exercised in licensing the use of vehicles where the primary purpose is to regulate or restrict their use; and this is true even though some revenue arises from the fees collected, and although such revenue is applied to the repair of the streets. 2   The fact that revenue is incidentally derived from the license or registration fee does not invalidate a law as a police regulation if the revenue is not so disproportionate as to make the fee charged unreasonable. 3   However, if the fee exacted exceeds the amount necessary for the administration of the law, it is an exercise of the power of taxation, or, to express it in other words, a revenue measure. 4  

̈ Observation: Even requirements imposed primarily under the police power may have the secondary purpose of raising revenue. 5  In other words, the police power and the taxing power may be exercised jointly in the enactment of a valid licensing statute. 6 

Footnote 86. 71 Am Jur 2d,  State and Local Taxation § 196.

Footnote 87. Storaasli v. State of Minn.,  283 U.S. 57,  51 S. Ct. 354,  75 L. Ed. 839 (1931); Ingels v. Riley, 5 Cal. 2d 154, 53 P.2d 939,  103 A.L.R. 1 (1936); Ex parte Kessler, 26 Idaho 764, 146 P. 113 (1915); Kane v. Titus, 81 N.J.L. 594, 80 A. 453 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1911), aff'd,  242 U.S. 160,  37 S. Ct. 30,  61 L. Ed. 222 (1916); Camas Stage Co. v. Kozer, 104 Or. 600, 209 P. 95,  25 A.L.R. 27 (1922).

A fee applied to trailers used in transporting goods to and from Puerto Rico is not a tax, where the fees paid are held separately from general state funds, are dedicated exclusively to reimbursing private parties and covering administrative expenses, are collected only from those seeking the privilege of driving on state highways, and are proportioned to compensate victims for specified damages resulting from that activity.  Trailer Marine Transport Corp. v. Rivera Vazquez, 977 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, (Oct. 28, 1992).

As to the power to license or tax motor vehicles, generally, see  §§ 59 et seq.

As to methods of determining the amount of the tax, generally, see  §§ 74 et seq.

Footnote 88. Brown v. County of Horry, 308 S.C. 180, 417 S.E.2d 565 (1992).

Footnote 89. Ex parte Kessler, 26 Idaho 764, 146 P. 113 (1915); Kane v. Titus, 81 N.J.L. 594, 80 A. 453 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1911), aff'd,  242 U.S. 160,  37 S. Ct. 30,  61 L. Ed. 222 (1916); State v. Mirabal, 33 N.M. 553, 273 P. 928,  62 A.L.R. 296 (1928); Camas Stage Co. v. Kozer, 104 Or. 600, 209 P. 95,  25 A.L.R. 27 (1922).

As to the taxation of property on the basis of its value, generally, see 71 Am Jur 2d,  State and Local Taxation §§ 753 et seq.

Footnote 90. Storaasli v. State of Minn.,  283 U.S. 57,  51 S. Ct. 354,  75 L. Ed. 839 (1931).

Footnote 91. Ex parte Kessler, 26 Idaho 764, 146 P. 113 (1915); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 188 Mass. 79, 74 N.E. 255 (1905).

Footnote 92. City of Ft. Smith v. Scruggs, 70 Ark. 549, 69 S.W. 679,  59 A.L.R. 921 (1902); Ingels v. Riley, 5 Cal. 2d 154, 53 P.2d 939,  103 A.L.R. 1 (1936); Ex parte Schuler, 167 Cal. 282, 139 P. 685 (1914); Ex parte Kessler, 26 Idaho 764, 146 P. 113 (1915); Harder's Fireproof Storage & Van Co. v. City of Chicago, 235 Ill. 58, 85 N.E. 245 (1908); Kane v. Titus, 81 N.J.L. 594, 80 A. 453 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1911), aff'd,  242 U.S. 160,  37 S. Ct. 30,  61 L. Ed. 222 (1916); Camas Stage Co. v. Kozer, 104 Or. 600, 209 P. 95,  25 A.L.R. 27 (1922).

Footnote 93. Brown v. County of Horry, 308 S.C. 180, 417 S.E.2d 565 (1992) (road maintenance fee is service charge).

Footnote 94. Hendrick v. State of Maryland,  235 U.S. 610,  35 S. Ct. 140,  59 L. Ed. 385 (1915); City of Ft. Smith v. Scruggs, 70 Ark. 549, 69 S.W. 679,  59 A.L.R. 921 (1902); State v. Lawrence, 108 Miss. 291, 66 So. 745 (1914); Kane v. Titus, 81 N.J.L. 594, 80 A. 453 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1911), aff'd,  242 U.S. 160,  37 S. Ct. 30,  61 L. Ed. 222 (1916).

Footnote 95. Powell v. Gleason, 50 Ariz. 542, 74 P.2d 47,  114 A.L.R. 838 (1937); Walker v. Bedford, 93 Colo. 400, 26 P.2d 1051 (1933).

Footnote 96. Raymond v. Holm, 165 Minn. 215, 206 N.W. 166 (1925).

Footnote 97. State v. Wetz, 40 N.D. 299, 168 N.W. 835,  5 A.L.R. 731 (1918).

Footnote 98. Com. v. Thomas Heavy Hauling, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 807 (Ky. 1994) (legislative designation not conclusive); Vernor v. Secretary of State, 179 Mich. 157, 146 N.W. 338 (1914); Camas Stage Co. v. Kozer, 104 Or. 600, 209 P. 95,  25 A.L.R. 27 (1922).

Footnote 99. Vernor v. Secretary of State, 179 Mich. 157, 146 N.W. 338 (1914); Camas Stage Co. v. Kozer, 104 Or. 600, 209 P. 95,  25 A.L.R. 27 (1922).

Footnote 1. Com. v. Thomas Heavy Hauling, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 807 (Ky. 1994).

As to the limitation of license fees to the cost of administering the program, generally, see  § 72.

Footnote 2. People's Taxicab Co. v. City of Wichita, 140 Kan. 129, 34 P.2d 545,  95 A.L.R. 1218 (1934), appeal dismissed,  294 U.S. 691,  55 S. Ct. 352,  79 L. Ed. 1231 (1935); Borough of Applewold v. Dosch, 239 Pa. 479, 86 A. 1070 (1913).

As to limits on the amount of fees levied under the police power, see  § 72.

Footnote 3. Vernor v. Secretary of State, 179 Mich. 157, 146 N.W. 338 (1914).

Footnote 4. State v. Preston, 103 Or. 631, 206 P. 304,  23 A.L.R. 414 (1922).

Footnote 5. Carley & Hamilton v. Snook,  281 U.S. 66,  50 S. Ct. 204,  74 L. Ed. 704,  68 A.L.R. 194 (1930); Harder's Fireproof Storage & Van Co. v. City of Chicago, 235 Ill. 58, 85 N.E. 245 (1908).

Footnote 6. Bolton-Swanby Co. v. Owens, 201 Minn. 162, 275 N.W. 855 (1937); State v. Preston, 103 Or. 631, 206 P. 304,  23 A.L.R. 414 (1922).

In levying motor vehicle registration or licensing fees or taxes, statutes may validly put pleasure vehicles and commercial vehicles in different classifications. 43    Moreover, statutes may single out motor vehicles used for commercial purposes and levy a license or registration fee or tax on them not levied on other motor vehicles, 44  or vice versa. 45

Footnote 43. Fisher Bros. Co. v. Brown, 111 Ohio St. 602, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 740, 146 N.E. 100 (1924); Carter v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 96, 96 P.2d 727,  126 A.L.R. 1402 (1939); State v. Caplan, 100 Vt. 140, 135 A. 705 (1927).

Footnote 44. Hill v. Moody, 207 Ala. 325, 93 So. 422 (1922); Iowa Motor Vehicle Ass'n v. Board of R.R. Com'rs, 207 Iowa 461, 221 N.W. 364,  75 A.L.R. 1 (1928), aff'd,  280 U.S. 529,  50 S. Ct. 151,  74 L. Ed. 595 (1930).

Footnote 45. Ogilvie v. Hailey, 141 Tenn. 392, 210 S.W. 645 (1919), holding that a statute providing for a privilege tax on automobiles used for pleasure but failing to tax automobiles used for business was not invalid as arbitrary and discriminatory.