complaint

When the police officer initiates contact he begins a process. He SHALL/MUST/IS REQUIRED do certain things. If the police officer does not release the arrested party and elects to issue a NOTICE TO APPEAR, the officer is required to issue one of 3 copies of a NOTICE TO APPEAR to the accused and then what does he do with the other 2?

The Legislature has distinguished between a “written complaint” and a “notice to appear in court”, at the foregoing VEHICLE CODE section. (When you're "stopped", the Legislature calls that an "arrest".)

The police officer is REQUIRED to make a "written complaint", if he plans on having his allegations prosecuted. The "written complaint" MUST be under OATH, if the police officer plans to have his allegations prosecuted. The police officer is REQUIRED to sign the "written complaint" under penalty of perjury if the police officer plans on having his allegations prosecuted, OR, according to the Legislature, the requirements of PENAL CODE §740 have not been fulfilled and that is a "due process" issue.

The police officer puts what he presumed or believed on a NOTICE TO APPEAR, and the Legislature has informed us at EVIDENCE CODE §600, a presumption is not EVIDENCE.

"Every fact which, if controverted, plaintiff must prove to maintain his action must be stated in the complaint."
Jerome v. Stebbins (1859), 14 C. 457;
Green v. Palmer (1860), 15 C. 411, 76 Am. Sec. 492;
Johnson v. Santa Clara County (1865), 28 C. 545.

"The complaint, on its face, must show that the plaintiff has the better right."
Rogers v. Shannon (1877), 52 C. 99.

"Complaint, to be sufficient, must contain a statement of facts which, without the aid of other facts not stated shows a complete cause of action."
Going v. Didwiddle (1890), 86 C. 633, 25 P. 129.

"Pleadings should set forth facts, and not merely the opinions of parties."
Snow v. Halstead (1851), 1 C. 359.

"A complaint must contain a statement of facts showing the jurisdiction of the court, ownership of a right by plaintiff, violation of that right by the defendant, injury resulting to
plaintiff by such violation, justification for equitable relief where that is sought, and a demand for relief."
Pierce v. Wagner, 134 F.2d. 958.

"Essential facts on which legal points in controversy depend, should be pleaded clearly and precisely, so that nothing is left for court to surmise."
Gates v. Lane (1872), 44 C. 392.

"The test of the materiality of an averment in a pleading is this: Could the averment be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient?"
Whitwell v. Thomas (1858), 9 C. 499.

"In pleading, the essential facts on which a determination of the controversy depends should be stated with clearness and precision so that nothing is left to surmise."
Bernstein v. Fuller (1950), 98 C.A.2d 441, 220 P.2d 558.

"The "facts" which the court is to find and the "facts" which a pleader is to state lie in the same plane - that is, in both connections, "facts" are to be stated according to their legal effect."
Hihn v. Peck (1866), 30 C. 280.

"A plaintiff must set forth in his complaint the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with sufficient clarity and particularity that defendant may be apprized of nature, source and extent of his cause of action."
Metzenbaum v. Metzenbaum (1948), 86 C.A.2d 750, 195 P.2d 492.

"In general, matters of substance must be alleged in direct terms, and not by way of recital or reference."
Silvers v. Grossman (1920), 183 C. 693, 192 P. 534; Reid v. Kerr (1923), 64 C.A. 117, 220 P. 688.

"A fact which constitutes an essential element of a cause of action cannot be left to inference."
Roberts v. Roberts, 81 C.A.2d 871, 185 P.2d 381.

"Material facts must be alleged directly and not by way of recital."
Vilardo v. Sacramento County (1942), 54 C.A.2d 413, 129 P.2d 165.

"Material allegations must be distinctly stated in complaint."
Goland v. Peter Nolan & Co. (1934), 33 P.2d 688, subsequent opinion 38 P.2d 783, 2 C.2d 96.

"Matters of substance must be presented by direct averment and not by way of recital."
Stefani v. Southern Pacific Co. (1932), 119 C.A. 69, 5 P.2d 946.

"A pleading which leaves essential facts to inference or argument is bad."
Ahlers. v. Smiley (1909), 11 C.A.343, 104 P. 997.

"The forms alone of the several actions have been abolished by the statute. The substantial allegations of the complaint in a given case must be the same under our practice act as at common law."
Miller v. Van Tassel (1864), 24 C. 459.

"A pleading cannot be aided by reason of facts not averred."
San Diego County v. Utt (1916), 173 C. 554, 160 P. 657.

"Facts necessary to a cause of action but not alleged must be taken as having no existence."
Frace v. Long Beach City High School Dist. (1943), 137 P.2d 60, 58 C.A.2d 566.

"A fact necessary to pleader's cause of action, if not pleaded, must be taken as having no existence."
Feldesman v. McGovern (1941), 44 C.A.2d 566.

"When pleading is silent as to material dates, or does not clearly state facts relied on, it must be presumed that statement thereof would weaken pleader's case."
Whittemore v. Davis (1931), 112 C.A. 702, 297 P. 640.

"Material matters in pleadings must be distinctly stated in ordinary and concise language."
Brown v. Sweet (1928), 95 C.A. 117, 272 P. 614.

"Facts contained in public records should be alleged in pleading when they constitute necessary elements of good cause of action."
Gray v. White (1935), 5 C.A.2d 463, 43 P.2d 318.

"When facts are available from public records, it is ordinarily improper to allege such facts on mere information and belief."
People v. Birch Securities Co. (1948), 196 P.2d 143, 86 C.A.2d 703, cert. denied Birch Securities Co. v. People of State of California, 69 S.Ct. 745, 336 U.S. 936, 93 L.Ed. 1095.

NOTICE. The information given of some act done, or the interpellation by which some act is required to be done. It also signifies, simply, knowledge; as A had notice that B was a slave. 5 How. S. C. Rep. 216; 7 Penn. Law Journ. 119.
     2. Notices should always be in writing; they should state, in precise terms, their object, and be signed by the proper person, or his authorized agent, be dated, and addressed to the person to be affected by them.
     3. Notices are actual, as when they are directly given to the party to be affected by them; or constructive, as when the party by any circumstance whatever, is put upon inquiry, which amounts in judgment of law to notice, provided the, inquiry becomes a duty. Vide 2 Pow. Mortg. 561 to 662; 2 Stark. Ev. 987; 1 Phil. Ev. Index, b. t.; 1 Vern. 364, n.; 4 Kent, Com. 172; 16 Vin. Ab. 2; 2 Supp. to Ves. jr. 250; Grah. Pr. Index, h.t.; Chit. PI. Index, h.t.; 2 Mason, 531; 14 Pick. 224; 4 N. H. ]Rep. 397; 14 S. & R. 333; Bouv. Inst. Index, h.t.
     4. With respect to the necessity for giving notice, says Mr. Chitty, 1 Pr. 496, the rules of law are most evidently founded on good sense and so as to accord with the intention of the parties. The giving notice in certain cases obviously is in the nature of a condition precedent to the right to call on the other party for the performance of his engagement, whether his contract were express or implied. Thus, in the familiar instance of bills of exchange and promissory notes, the implied contract of an indorser is, that be will pay the bill or note, provided it be not paid, on presentment at maturity, by the acceptor or maker, (being the party primarily liable, and provided that he (the indorser) has due notice of the dishonor, and without which be is discharged from all liability; consequently, it is essential for the holder to be prepared to prove affirmatively that such notice was given, or some facts dispensing with such notice.
     5. Whenever the defendant's liability to perform an act depends on defendant is not legally bound to take notice, the plaintiff must prove that due notice, was in fact given. So in cases of insurances on ships, a notice
of abandonment is frequently necessary to enable the assured plaintiff to proceed as for a total lose when something remains to be saved, in relation to which, upon notice, the insurers might themselves take their own measures.
     6. To avoid doubt or ambiguity in the terms of the notice, it may be advisable to give it in writing, and to preserve evidence of its delivery, as in the case of notices of the dishonor of a bill.
     7. The form of the notice may be as subscribed, but it must necessarily vary in its terms according to the circumstances of each case. So, in order to entitle a party to insist upon a strict and exact performance of a
contract on the fixed day for completing it, and a fortiori to retain a deposit as forfeited, a reasonable notice must be given of the intention to insist on a precise performance, or be will be considered as having waived
such strict right. So if a lessee or a purchaser be sued for the recovery of the estate, and he have a remedy over against a third person, upon a covenant for quiet enjoyment, it is expedient (although not absolutely
necessary) referring to such covenant.
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1856

"A mere conclusion of a pleader cannot be availed of to initiate and invite an issue of fact."
Hatfield v. Peoples Water Co. (1914), 25 C.A. 711, 145 P. 164.

"One may not by the mere device of an allegation in a pleading create a legal duty that otherwise does not exist."
Pascoe v. Southern California Edison Co. (1951), 102 C.A.2d 254, 227 P.2d 555.

"Allegations of legal conclusions cannot be permitted to supply essential allegations of fact."
Bailes v. Keck (1927), 200 C. 697, 254 P. 573, 51 A.L.R. 930.

"Pleadings should allege facts, and not mere conclusions of law."
Bailes v. Keck (1927), 200 C. 697, 254 P. 573, 51 A.L.R. 930.

"A pleading must allege facts and not conclusions, and conclusions of law are not admitted by demurrer."
Vilardo v. Sacramento County (1942), 54 C.A.2d 413, 129 P.2d 165.

"Facts, not mere conclusions, should be alleged to establish right to specific performance of contract."
Foley v. Cowan (1947), 80 C.A.2d 70, 181 P.2d 410.

"Allegation of conclusion of law tenders no issue."
California Western Holding Co. v. Merrill (1935), 7 C.A.2d 131, 46 P.2d 175.

"Conclusions of law in a pleading are disregarded."
Koehler v. Coronado (1927), 83 C.A. 648, 257 P. 187.