...a detention is expanded to cover any occasion where an officer personally contacts an individual whom the officer suspects may be involved in some criminal activity...

 ...a detention occurs if the suspect is not free to leave at will -- if he is kept in the officer's presence by physical restraint, threat of force, or assertion of authority. (See, e.g., Restani v. Superior Court (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 189, 197 [91 Cal.Rptr. 429].) But the definition is underinclusive: actual or threatened physical restraints are the characteristics of a full-blown arrest (Pen. Code, § 835), and an officer will frequently use more subtle methods to detain a suspect whom he wishes simply to question about possible criminal activity. The definition is also overinclusive: either through fear or respect, many persons who are not in fact under detention nevertheless do not feel free to leave at will when a uniformed police officer indicates a desire to talk with them.

 Detention decisions normally arise when an officer is confronted by a spontaneous, fast-changing situation. Often, if action is to be taken, it necessitates quick, sometimes immediate, action on the part of the officer.
 In re Tony C. , 21 Cal.3d 888
 [Crim. No. 20142. Supreme Court of California. August 24, 1978.]

The United States Supreme Court has identified three categories of police contact with
 persons. The first is referred to as a "consensual encounter" in which there is no restraint on
 the person's liberty. There need be no objective justification for such an encounter. The
 second type, called "detention," involves a seizure of the individual for a limited duration and
 for limited purposes. A constitutionally acceptable detention can occur "if there is an
 articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime." The
 third type involves seizures in the nature of an arrest, which may occur only if the police have
 probable cause to arrest the person for a crime. (Florida v. Royer, supra, 460 U.S. 491;Wilson v.
 Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d 777.)
  PEOPLE v. BAILEY , 176 Cal.App.3d 402
  [No. H000583. Court of Appeals of California, Sixth Appellate District. December 17,1985.]
  Emphasis added]
 

[2] " '[I]n order to justify an investigative stop or detention the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity. Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so: the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience [citation], to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question. The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citations.]' " (In re James D. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 903 , 914 [239 Cal.Rptr. 663, 741 P.2d 161]; cf. Scott v. United States (1978) 436 U.S. 128, 138 [56 L.Ed.2d 168, 178, 98 S.Ct. 1717].)
People v. Renteria , 2 Cal.App.4th 440
[No. B055019. Second Dist., Div. Six. Jan 7, 1992.]

[2] It is a well recognized rule in California that an officer may stop a motorist or pedestrian for
questioning under circumstances short of probable cause for an arrest. (People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448 , 450 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658]; People v. Collins (Cal.App.) 80 Cal.Rptr. 310; People v. Villafuerte, 275 Cal.App.2d 531 , 533 [80 Cal.Rptr. 279]; People v. Brown, 271 Cal.App.2d 391 , 394-395 [76 Cal.Rptr. 568]; People v. Stephenson, 268 Cal.App.2d 908 , 910 [74 Cal.Rptr. 504]; People v. Manis, 268 Cal.App.2d 653 , 658 [74 Cal.Rptr. 423]; People v. Beal, 268 Cal.App.2d 481 , 484 [73 Cal.Rptr. 787]; People v. Cruppi, 265 Cal.App.2d 9 , 11 [71 Cal.Rptr. 42]; People v. Henze, 253 Cal.App.2d 986 , 988 [61 Cal.Rptr. 545]; People v. Perez, 243 Cal.App.2d 528 , 531 [52 Cal.Rptr. 514].) [3] The generally accepted criterion for determining the validity of a temporary stopping for investigation is whether the circumstances would have indicated to a reasonable man in like position that an investigation was necessary to a proper discharge of the officer's duties. (People v. Gibson, 220 Cal.App.2d 15 , 20 [33 Cal.Rptr. 775]; Williams v. Superior Court, 274 Cal.App.2d 709 , 711 [79 Cal.Rptr. 489]; People v. Perez, supra, at p. 531; People v. Collins, supra; People v. Manis, supra, at p. 659.)
Cornforth v. Department of Motor Vehicles , 3 Cal.App.3d 550
[Civ. No. 26694. Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Four. January 16, 1970.]

[1a] There was no probable cause to arrest petitioner for any offense. [2] "Although circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest may still justify an officer in stopping a pedestrian on the streets for questioning, a police officer may not detain and question a person when there are no circumstances which would indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course was necessary to the proper discharge of the officer's duties. [Citation.]" (People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674 , 682-683 [72 Cal.Rptr. 300, 446 P.2d 800].) [1b] There were in the
facts heretofore related no suspicious circumstances sufficient to justify the officers in the first place to stop, pat down the young men and later to search the vehicle. "Neither good faith of the officers nor an inarticulated hunch will suffice to justify the intrusion (Terry v. Ohio, ... 392 U.S. 1, 22 [20 L.Ed.2d 899, 906, 88 S.Ct. 1868]). Here there was even less." (Willett v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.App.3d 555 , 559 [83 Cal.Rptr. 22].)
Stern v. Superior Court , 18 Cal.App.3d 26
[Civ. No. 38126. Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four. June 10, 1971.]

[3] The officer's mere hunch will not validate his conduct, even though in good faith. "'There must be a "rational" suspicion by the peace officer that some activity out of the ordinary is or has taken place ... some indication to connect the person under suspicion with the unusual activity ... [and] some suggestion that the activity is related to crime.' [Citation.] Where the events are as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity, a detention based on those events is [18 Cal.App.3d 30] unlawful. [Citations.]" (Irwin v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 423 , 427 [82 Cal.Rptr. 484, 462 P.2d 12].)
Ibid.

[4] Moreover, the fact that an arrest is made does not justify an exploratory search for evidence of other crimes. (People v. Roberts, 47 Cal.2d 374 , 378 [303 P.2d 721].) [1c] The search in the present case was made incident to an illegal arrest and was patently invalid and improper.
Ibid.

Consent secured at gunpoint following an illegal arrest cannot be relied upon to render the evidence obtained by a search and seizure pursuant thereto admissible. (People v. Haven, 59 Cal.2d 713 , 718-719 [31 Cal.Rptr. 47, 381 P.2d 927].)
Ibid.

An arrest does not justify an [2 Cal.App.3d 560] exploratory search for evidence of other crimes (People v. Roberts, 47 Cal.2d 374, 378 [303 P.2d 721]; People v. Mills, 148 Cal.App.2d 392, 401 [306 P.2d 1005]).
Willett v. Superior Court , 2 Cal.App.3d 555
[Civ. No. 9948. Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One.  December 11, 1969.]

Defendant makes a prima facie case of unlawful arrest when he establishes that arrest was made
without a warrant, and burden rests on persecution to show proper justification.
People v. Holguin (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d. 520 [302 P.2d. 635].

...a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity is needed to justify a detention.
People v. Gonzalez (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 381 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 640]
People v. Castellon (1999) , 76 Cal.App.4th 1369

[6] The basic premise behind "consensual encounters" is that a citizen may consent voluntarily to official intrusions upon interests protected by the Constitution. If the citizen acts in reasonable submission to a show of authority, then his actions are not voluntary or consensual. Where consensual, consent may be withdrawn at any time. (People v.Gurtenstein (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 441 , 451 [138 Cal.Rptr. 161].) The citizen participant in a consensual encounter may leave, refuse to answer questions or decline to act in the manner requested by the authorities.

...if the manner in which the request was made constituted a show of authority such that appellant reasonably might believe he had to comply, then the encounter was transformed into a detention.
People v. Franklin , 192 Cal.App.3d 935

[3] The fact the restraint on Ms. Spicer's liberty was minimal does not make the restraint a reasonable one. The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person including those consuming no more than a minute. (United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 879-880 [45 L.Ed.2d at pp. 615-616].)

...evidence also supports the conclusion Ms. Spicer's freedom of movement was restrained by a show of authority. (Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 553 [64 L.Ed.2d at p. 508];Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 501 [75 L.Ed.2d at p. 239, 103 S.Ct. at p. 1326];In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888 , 895 [148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957].) She was confronted by a uniformed officer almost immediately after the car in which she was riding was stopped. Without any explanation or prefatory remarks, the officer requested her driver's license.

An unequivocal verbal command is far more likely to produce the perception of restricted liberty than a mere approach (People v. Jones (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 820 , 825-826 [158 Cal.Rptr. 415]), casual banter (People v. Warren, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 996), or an ambiguous statement which could be either a command or a request. (People v. King (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 346 , 349-350 [139 Cal.Rptr. 926].) Furthermore, "'a reasonable person might read an officer's "May I" as the courteous expression of a demand backed by force of law.'" (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 289 [36 L.Ed.2d 854, 898, 93 S.Ct. 2041], Marshall, J., dis.) The attitude expressed by Ms. Spicer toward the police is credible and almost certainly typical. She testified, "I just felt like if a policeman should ever stop me if he wants my purse he will ask me. If he asks me to get out of car I am coming out with [my] hands free. I have read too many people getting shot these days by policemen who thought ...." fn. 3
PEOPLE v. SPICER , 157 Cal.App.3d 213
[Crim. No. 45072. Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven. June 15, 1984.]

Where, however, an investigative stop or detention is "predicated on circumstances  which, when viewed objectively, support a mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch", the stop is unlawful even though the officer may have been acting in good faith. (People v. Conway (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 385 , 389 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 533].) fn. 2
People v Ramirez, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 311

  QUESTION:     At what section of the CALIFORNIA VEHICLE CODE has the Legislature authorized a
                          "DETENTION"?

HINT:               None of them.  The Legislature HAS used the words "warrantless arrest".  You MAY be "DETAINED"                             AFTER you are *ARRESTED

From WordNet 1.6 :

  exigent
    aj 1: demanding attention; "clamant needs"; "a crying need"; "regarded
          literary questions as exigent and momentous"- H.L.Mencken;
          "insistent hunger"; "an instant need"
          [syn: clamant, crying, insistent, instant]
       2: requiring precise accuracy; "an exacting job"; "became more exigent
          over his pronunciation"
          [syn: exacting]

  Exigent \Ex"i*gent\, n.
     1. Exigency; pressing necessity; decisive moment. [Obs.]

              Why do you cross me in this exigent?  --Shak.

     2. (o. Eng. Law) The name of a writ in proceedings before
        outlawry. --Abbott.

From Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913) :

  Exigent \Ex`i*gent\, a. [L. exigens, -entis, p. pr. of exigere
     to drive out or forth, require, exact. See Exact.]
     Exacting or requiring immediate aid or action; pressing;
     critical. ``At this exigent moment.'' --Burke.

940.  To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him.

"The privilege against self-incrimination is neither accorded to the passive resistant, nor the person who is
ignorant of his rights, nor to one indifferent thereto. It is a fighting clause. Its benefits can be retained only
by sustained combat. It cannot be claimed by an attorney or solicitor.  It is valid only when insisted upon by a belligerent claimant in person."
US v Johnson, 76 F. Supp 538.

Founded suspicion must exist at the time the officer initiates the stop.
U.S. v. Thomas, 863 F2d. 622, 625

In evaluating whether founded suspicion exists, the totality of circumstances should be considered.
U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8; U.S. v. Hernandez-Alvarado , 891 F2d. 1414.

Police officer may not rely on good faith, inarticulable hunches, or generalized suspicions to meet standard of reasonable suspicion to justify investigatory stop.
U.S.  v.  Velarde, 823 F. Supp. 792.  (D. Hawaii 1993)

Founded suspicion exists when the officer is aware of specific articulable facts that, together with rational
inferences drawn from them, reasonable warrant a suspicion that the person to be detain has committed or
is about to commit a crime.
U.S. v. Cortez 449 U.S. 411, 416, U.S. v. Robert L., 874 F2d. 701, 703

The U.S. Supreme Court has defined and limited investigative detention.  Any restraint of a person for the
purpose of checking identification and asking questions or detaining him or her briefly while obtaining is such
a detention; it comported with the Fourth Amendment only when based on articulable facts supporting a
reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a criminal offense.  The mere presence with someone
who has a outstanding arrest warrant is not sufficient.
U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 [83 L.Ed.2d. 604].

In a unanimous decision the U.S. Supreme Court held: 'demand for identification is an intrusion on the
interests prohibited by the Fourth Amendment and requires reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts
relating to the person or his or her conduct, in order to be lawful.

When police officers, with or without arresting an individual, detain the individual for the purpose of
requiring him to identify himself, they perform a seizure of person subject to the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. ...that the defendant's conviction requiring identification upon a lawful stop was improper, the
police officer's stopping the defendant and requiring him to identify himself violated defendant's Fist, Fourth
and Fifth Amendments was in violation of...United States Constitution when the police officer has no
reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was engaged or been engaged in criminal conduct.
Brown v. Texas, (1979) 443 U.S. 46 [61 L.Ed.2d. 357].

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons and things to be seized.
Article I,  Sec. 19, Constitution of the State of California, 1849

This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny
others, retained by the people.
Article I, Sec. 21, Constitution of the State of California, 1849

The people shall have the right freely to assemble together, to consult for the common good, to instruct their representatives, and to petition the legislature for redress of grievances.
Artilce I, Sec. 10, Constitution of the State of California, 1849

A constitutional amendment adopted in 1974 elevated the right of privacy to an "inalienable right" expressly protected by force of constitutional mandate (Cal. Const. art. I, 1). It may be safely assumed that the right of privacy extends to one's confidential financial affairs as well as to the details on one's personal life.  Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Ct. (1975) 15 Cal.3d. 652, [125 Cal.Rptr. 553, 542 P.2d. 977]

"The  Fourth Amendment, of course, `applies  to all seizures of the person,  including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional  arrest.'  Davis v. Mississippi,  394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968).  '[W]henever a police officer accosts an  individual and restrains  his freedom to walk  away, he has 'seized' that  person... and  the fourth Amendment  requires that  the seizure be 'reasonable'.'
U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)"

"But even assuming that purpose (prevention of crime) is served to some degree by stopping and demanding identification from an individual without any specific basis for believing he is involved in criminal activity, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it..."

"We  need  not decide  whether an  individual  may be  punished for refusing  to identify himself  in the context of a lawful investigatory stop  which satisfies Fourth Amendment  requirements. See Dunaway v. New York,  442 U.S. 200,210  n.12 (1979); Terry v.  Ohio... the county judge who convicted appellant was troubled by  this question, as shown by the colloquy set out in the appendix to this opinion."

"Accordingly,  appellant  may  not  be  punished  for  refusing  to identify himself,...
Brown v. Texas,  443 U.S.  47  (1979)

“Any evidence that accused was threatened, tricked or cajoled into waiver will show that he did not voluntarily waive privilege to remain silent."
Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 468.

"To  maintain an action under  42 USC 1983, it  is not necessary to allege or prove that the defendants intended to deprive plaintiff of his Constitutional  rights or that they acted willfully, purposefully, or in a  furtherance of a conspiracy.  . . it is  sufficient to establish that the  deprivation. . . was the  natural consequences of defendants acting under  color of law. . .  ."
Ethridge v. Rhodos,  DC Ohio 268 F Supp 83 (1967), Whirl v. Kern CA 5 Texas 407 F 2d 781 (1968)

A police officer will be afforded little assistance in his or her detention decision by an open-ended general standard, such as "reasonableness," [21 Cal.3d 904] which "is obviously much too amorphous either to guide or regulate the police." (Amsterdam, op. cit. supra, 58 Minn.L.Rev. at pp. 414-415; cf., post, at pp. 905-907.) As commands or controls on police officers, these types of rules are "splendid in [their] flexibility, [but] awful in [their] unintelligibility, unadministrability, enforcibility and general ooziness." (Amsterdam, op. cit. supra, at p. 415.)
In re Tony C. , 21 Cal.3d 888
[Crim. No. 20142. Supreme Court of California. August 24, 1978.]

From WordNet 1.6 :

  birthright
    n  1: a right or privilege that you are entitled to at birth; "free
          public education is the birthright of every American child"
       2: an inheritance coming by right of birth (especially b
          primogeniture)
          [syn: patrimony]
       3: personal characteristics that are inherited at birth

From Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913) :

  Birthright \Birth"right`\, n.
     Any right, privilege, or possession to which a person is
     entitled by birth, such as an estate descendible by law to an
     heir, or civil liberty under a free constitution; esp. the
     rights or inheritance of the first born.