Before one can mount a proper defense to an allegation of a violation of the VEHICLE CODE, it is of utmost importance to determine whether the rules of Criminal or Civil Procedure are to be used.
“...noncriminal traffic offense...”
WELSH v. WISCONSIN, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)
Why is it important to know whether the matter is CIVIL or CRIMINAL in nature? 1. It's your CONSTITUTIONALLY SECURED RIGHT TO KNOW. 2. There are RULES of law and the rules for CIVIL are different than rules for CRIMINAL allegations.
“...penal provisions in other codes as well, including those found in the Vehicle Code"
“...it is questionable whether the Legislature considers an infraction to be a "crime."
Inconsistency of Sections 19c and 1042.5 vis-a-vis 689 of the Penal Code
[2] Section 16 of the Penal Code declares that "crimes and public offenses" include not only felonies and misdemeanors but also infractions. Sections 19c and 1042.5 of the Penal Code deprive a person accused of an infraction of the right to jury trial. Yet, section 689 of the Penal Code declares that "[n]o person can be convicted of a public offense unless by verdict of a jury." (Italics added.) (The 1968 amendment of section 16 of the Penal Code substituted the words "crimes and public offenses include:" for the words "crimes, how defined. Crimes are divided into.")
If the Legislature intended to treat infractions as public offenses and if the charging of a public offense invokes the right to trial by jury, sections 19c and 1042.5, which deny a jury to one who commits an infraction, conflict with section 689. However, the same (1968) Legislature enacted section 19c, the pertinent amendment of section 16 and section 1042.5. Construing these sections in accordance with the precepts laid down in In re Kay, supra, we must conclude that it was not the intent of the Legislature to enact inconsistent statutes and, further, that when it added the term "public offense" to section 16 it was not so categorizing infractions because if it did so, it would have caused inconsistency between sections 19c and 689 of the Penal Code. Support for this interpretation is found in the language of section 1042.5 which states that a defendant "charged with an infraction and with a public offense for which there is a right to jury trial" (italics added) may be accorded a jury trial. Had the Legislature intended that an infraction be treated as a public offense, it would have worded the statute differently, for example, "an infraction and with some other public offense."
Furthermore, this court has previously held in People v. Oppenheimer (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d Supp. 4, 7, fn. 2 [116 Cal.Rptr. 795], that inasmuch as section 689 of the Penal Code was originally enacted in 1872 and last amended in 1951, and sections 19c and 1042.5 of the Penal Code were enacted in 1968, we must read all the sections together and, in case of conflict, give effect to the latest enacted sections -- sections 19c and 1042.5. We therefore have declared in People v. Oppenheimer, supra, that sections 19c and 1042.5 qualify section 689 insofar as infractions are concerned. Hence, even though we were to treat an infraction as a public offense under section 16, we must nevertheless excise infractions from section 689 in order to effect the objective of the Legislature. (Pen. Code, § 4.)
The court in People v. Oppenheimer (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d Supp. 4 [116
Cal.Rptr. 795], declares that an
infraction is a petty offense. A defendant was not historically accorded
the right to a jury in trials of petty
offenses. Whether an infraction is characterized as a petty
offense or a noncriminal offense,...
HOLMES, P. J.
I concur because I do not believe the doctrine of Kellett v. Superior
Court, supra, 63 Cal.2d 822, was meant to apply to the kind of offenses
presently classified as infractions. (See In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d
325, 336 [42 Cal.Rptr. 228, 398 P.2d 420]; Mills v. Municipal Court (1973)
10 Cal.3d 288, 303-308 [110 Cal.Rptr. 329, 515 P.2d 273].)
People v. Battle , 50 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1
[Crim. A. No. 13180. Appellate Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles.
June 27, 1975.]
[Emphasis added]
"...penal provisions in other codes as well, including
those found in the Vehicle Code. (Neal v. State of California (1960) 55
Cal.2d 11, 18 fn. 1 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839]; People v. Kehoe (1949)
33 Cal.2d 711 [204 P.2d 321].)
In re Hayes , 70 Cal.2d 604
[Crim. No. 11647. In Bank. Mar 17, 1969.]
[Emphasis added]
A penal PROVISION does not make the CODE it is contained in CRIMINAL in nature.
Go
here to read
an outstanding Oregon Court of Appeals case stating that "traffic matters
are civil".
The VEHICLE CODE contains PENAL PROVISIONS, but the code in and of itself is not CRIMINAL in nature. The relationship one has with the DMV is predicated upon AGREEMENT.
Here's the PROOF that the relationship one has with the DMV is contractual in nature and is therefore prosecuted according to the Rules of Civil Procedure, AND it's from the VEHICLE CODE:
17453. The acceptance of rights and privileges under this code or any operation of a motor vehicle anywhere within this state as specified in Section 17451 shall be a signification of the irrevocable agreement ...17459. The acceptance by a resident of this state of a certificate of ownership or a certificate of registration of any motor vehicle or any renewal thereof, issued under the provisions of this code, shall constitute the consent by the person that service of summons may be made upon him within or without this state, whether or not he is then a resident of this state, in any action brought in the courts of this state upon a cause of action arising in this state out of the ownership or operation of the vehicle.
17460. The acceptance or retention by a resident of this state of a driver's license issued pursuant to the provisions of this code, shall constitute the consent of the person that service of summons may be made upon him within or without this state, whether or not he is then a resident of this state, in any action brought in the courts of this state upon a cause of action arising in this state out of his operation of a motor vehicle anywhere within this state.
You were GRANTED PERMISSION by the DMV. PERMISSION (consent) is an ESSENTIAL element of an AGREEMENT. Both parties CONSENTED and it's right there in black and white in the VEHICLE CODE.
Why should you care whether the matter is CIVIL or CRIMINAL? When you play a game there are RULES. The same thing applies in law. The court and the accuser MUST play by some set of RULES. IF you don't know which rules to play by your chances of prevailing are dramatically reduced.
Statutes of California, 1893, p.57, sect.1 (Feb.28, 1893) “SECTION 1. All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against the State not allowed by the State Board of Examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein contained, to bring suit thereon against the State in any of the Courts of this State of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgement. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to such suits, except herein otherwise provided”.
The police officer has filed a CLAIM on an alleged CONTRACT. IF the accusation is an INFRACTION, the CLAIM is for $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$. How can you possibly OWE someone ANYTHING if there is no AGREEMENT? How can you possibly OWE the DMV anything IF you don't have any of their stuff or use what they offer?